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AIDS, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE DIRECT THREAT

DEFENSE: THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE
CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
Sarah R. Christie*
This Note examines disability-related discrimination in light of the
protections afforded by the Americans with DisabilitiesAct (ADA) and in
the context of an HIV- or AIDS-infected employee. Under the ADA, an
employer may legally fire a worker who poses a direct threat to the
individuals around him or her. It is unclear, however, whether the burden
of proving or disproving the claim that an individual is a direct threat lies
with the employer or the employee. This Note analyzes the circuit split over
which party bears the burden of proof under the direct threat standard in
light ofprospective HIV-related litigation.
INTRODUCTION

Although a considerable number of disability-related discrimination
cases have been litigated, few of those cases have specifically addressed
discrimination in the context of an HIV-positive employee where the
employer's defense was that the worker posed a direct threat to the
individuals around him or her. While the general American public may be
unaware of the large contingent of HIV-positive individuals that comprise
part of the workforce, statistics indicate that the number of employees with
the illness is significant and growing. Because the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed before much of what is now known
about human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) was discovered, the statute contains a gap, and
threatens the possibility that HIV-positive individuals will not be
sufficiently protected against an employer's discriminatory actions. The
stigma that continues to surround the AIDS virus underscores how
prevalent intolerance of infected individuals continues to be, and how
important it is for courts to help eradicate discriminatory practices.
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA in response to findings that,
"historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem."1
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to
*

J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual because of his or her
disability. 2 Nonetheless, an employer may terminate or refuse to hire
someone if that person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others. 3 A direct threat to other employees, for example, might come in the
form of an insulin-dependent diabetic who experiences several seizures
while at work, performing his job handling hazardous chemicals. 4 While it
is the employee's burden to prove that he or she is "otherwise qualified" for
the job, 5 the statute and case law do not definitively answer whether the
burden of proving or disproving the allegation that an individual is a direct
threat lies with the defendant employer or with the plaintiff employee. 6 The
ambiguous statutory language has generated disagreement among the U.S.
Courts of Appeals: The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have found that
the employer bears the burden of proof, while the First, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that it is the employee's burden; the Fifth Circuit has
taken a mixed approach. 7 The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly
8
addressed this controversy.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the circuit split over which party
bears the burden of proof under the direct threat standard in light of
prospective HIV-related litigation. The alleged ambiguity in Title I of the
ADA has brought about conflicting outcomes among the circuit courts in
cases with relatively similar fact patterns. Generally, where the burden of
proof rests with the plaintiff employee, the defendant employer wins; where
the burden is on the defendant employer, the results are mixed. This Note
will examine each of the seven primary cases that serve as the framework
for disagreement, 9 specifically analyzing those decisions in light of their
potential impact on litigation involving individuals infected with HIV or
AIDS who bring suit under the ADA. Applying the holdings in School
Board v. Arline ° and Bragdon v. Abbott I as the basis for analysis, this
Note urges that the conflicting standard effectively minimizes the protection
of an employee's rights where that individual is disabled because of an
infectious disease. As a result, the legal standard in jurisdictions where the
burden of disproving the direct threat claim rests with the plaintiff,

2. Seeid. § 12112(a).
3. See id. § 12113(b).
4. See Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2001).
5. See infra Part I.A2.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part 1.Bl.a.
9. The seven cases are Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2004); McKenzie v.
Benton, 388 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 2004); Hutton v. ElfAtochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884
(9th Cir. 2001); Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc. (Rizzo II), 173 F.3d 254 (5th
Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997); Moses v. Am. Nonwovens,
Inc., 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996); and EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.
Mich. 1996).
10. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
11. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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irrespective of factual circumstances, disregards extenuating factors that
counsel for a different application of the rule.
The inconsistent decisions on the direct threat issue are even more
problematic in the context of HIV-related employment discrimination
because the Supreme Court has not decided whether HIV infection is a "per
se" disability, 1 2 thus leaving continued opportunity for courts to exercise
their own interpretation of the ADA. The unclear statutory language,
compounded by inconsistent case law, is of particular concern for
employees with HIV who sue their employers because the virus is often
unpredictable; an employee could conceivably go from being healthy, to
being a direct threat, to once again being healthy.' 3 There exists a clear
need to alleviate the tension between eliminating discrimination against
disabled individuals who have a communicable disease and preventing the
contraction of that disease by others.' 4 Nevertheless, that necessity should
not lead courts to conclude that one set standard, where the employee bears
the burden of proof, is the correct answer.
If the legal determination of whether a person with HIV poses a direct
threat to those around him is an individualized inquiry, 15 then ideally courts
should use analogous reasoning in resolving the burden of proof issue.
Analysis of existing case law demonstrates that a case-by-case
determination of which party bears the burden of proof is the most equitable
solution. However, the potential threat that an individualized approach to
the burden of proof issue would result in too great a disparity among
different jurisdictions counsels against a case-by-case determination and in
favor of one legal standard. Because the claim that an employee is a direct
threat is an affirmative defense, the employer should bear the burden of
proof. This standard makes particular sense under circumstances where the
employer is much better suited to evaluate whether the disabled individual
can safely perform the essential functions of the job. The success of
antiretroviral drugs means that HIV-infected individuals live longer,
healthier lives. 16 If an employer seeks to lawfully discriminate against such
an individual by asserting the protection of the direct threat defense, then
that employer should be legally responsible for justifying that decision.
Part I of this Note examines the historical and legislative background of
the ADA, case law regarding the current interpretation of how a disability is
classified, the alleged ambiguity inherent in the statute, and the way in
which courts determine if an individual may be classified as having a
disability. Part I also offers a brief history of the AIDS virus, including the
Supreme Court's relatively recent decision protecting individuals with
12. See id. at 641-42.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649 (citing Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987)).
15. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2006) ("The determination that an individual poses a
'direct threat' shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present
ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.").
16. See infra Part I.B.
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asymptomatic HIV.1 7 This part also examines the role of HIV and AIDS in
the workplace.
The analysis in Part II focuses on the seven cases comprising the circuit
split over which party bears the burden of proving, or disproving, that the
employee poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. In Part III,
this Note urges that, while ideally the determination of which party bears
the burden of proof should be an individualized inquiry, analogous to the
individualized inquiry required in determining whether an individual poses
a direct threat, case law suggests that it should be the employer who bears
the burden of proof. This Note argues that although the Fifth Circuit used
the right approach in Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc.
(Rizzo Ii) by creating a balancing test designed to shift the burden of proof
from the employee to the employer based on the existence of certain facts, 18
that court did not go far enough in protecting individuals with disabilities
who are also infected with a contagious disease. This Note explains why
the burden of proof issue is so critical in the context of HIV, why a case-bycase determination is often appropriate, and ultimately why the employer is
often in the best position to bear the burden of proving that an employee
poses a direct threat to those around him. Finally, the conclusion discusses
the new leadership on the Supreme Court, examining the possibility that the
current Court will not continue to support forward-thinking protections for
individuals disabled because of an infectious disease in a credible,
meaningful, or substantive way.
I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE

ADA

In 1920, upon the return of disabled World War I veterans, Congress
passed the first Rehabilitation Act, also known as the Fess-Kenyon Act. 19
The goal of this law was the integration of the disabled into mainstream
society. 20 Thus began the fundamental shift from perceiving disabled
individuals as "charity cases" to recognizing that the disabled were a group
who should be granted basic civil rights protections. This change in
mentality marked the "future of inclusion and integration" 2 1 sought by the
ADA and the end to the "exclusion and segregation" 22 that had previously
characterized society's actions and attitudes toward the disabled.

17. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 630-31.

18. See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs. (Rizzo I1), 173 F.3d 254, 259-60 (5th
Cir. 1999); see also Part II.Cl1.
19. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(111), at 5 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 448.
20. Id. at 25-26, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 448.
21. Id. at 26, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 449.
22. Id. Senator Harrison Williams remarked,
[F]or too long, we have been dealing with [the handicapped] out of charity ....
I
wish it to be said of America in the 1970's that when its attention at last returned

to domestic needs, it made a strong and new commitment to equal opportunity and
equal justice under law ....

The handicapped are one part of our Nation that have

been denied these fundamental rights for too long. It is for the Congress and the
Nation to assure that these rights are no longer denied.
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The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the broad antidiscrimination law to
follow the Fess-Kenyon Act and was the first law enacted to create federal
civil rights protection for individuals with a disability. 23 The Rehabilitation
Act reads, "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... ,,24 The act applied only to disabled persons employed by
federal contractors, 25 and was notably the first time that the government
sought to encourage employers to be proactive in hiring individuals with a
26
disability.
After the passage of the Rehabilitation Act but prior to the enactment of
the ADA, individuals with disabilities were still subject to abhorrent
28
treatment; 27 particularly, they were often denied access to public services.
Among Congress's many findings during the 1990 hearings that preceded
the ADA was the recognition that, historically, Americans with disabilities
had suffered "various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional
exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make
modifications to existing facilities and practices, [and] exclusionary
qualification standards .... 29 Statistical analysis further validated these
findings. A survey conducted at the time found that Americans with
disabilities were not only underprivileged and disadvantaged, but also that
they generally had less economic wealth, less education, and fewer social
History assumed that those with
and community opportunities. 30
disabilities could not be active contributors to society because of the
physical and mental limitations resulting from their condition. 3 1 Just as
society belatedly recognized that groups traditionally subject to
discrimination (namely African Americans and women) could be active
participants in society but were simply being constrained by the
Id. (alteration in original).
23. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 24-26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
446, 448.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
25. See, e.g., Scott E. Schaffer, Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.: Conquering the Final
Frontierof PaternalisticEmployment Practices,33 Conn. L. Rev. 1441, 1451 (2001) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000), which defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of
20 or more calendar weeks").
26. See id. at 1445-46.
27. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 n.9 (1987) (citing, as an example of
improper disability discrimination, a case where "a court ruled that a cerebral palsied child,
who was not a physical threat and was academically competitive, should be excluded from
public school, because his teacher claimed his physical appearance 'produced a nauseating
effect' on his classmates" (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n. 13 (1985))).
28. H.R. Rep. No. 10 1-485(11), at 24, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 447.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000).
30. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(111), at 25, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 447-48.
31. Id.
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discriminatory policies in place, the passage of the ADA marked the
realization and correction of this constraint on individuals with
32
disabilities.
A. Legislative History
Today, according to the International Center for Disability Information,
approximately fifty-eight million Americans have a disability. 33 This is
roughly a twenty-six percent increase over the number of Americans who
34
had disabilities in 1990, the year in which the ADA was signed into law.
The Judiciary Committee, which reviewed the law in 1990, explained that
the purpose of the statute was "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities
and to bring those individuals into the economic and social mainstream of
American life. '' 35 In further describing the law being promulgated, the
committee underscored that "[t]he ADA provides enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities and ensures
that the federal government will play a central role in enforcing these
standards on behalf of individuals with disabilities. '36 The legislators who
wrote the ADA viewed the statute's enactment as historic, similar to the
protections afforded to women and minorities by the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 37 Because the Rehabilitation Act served as a foundation for the
ADA, "[m]any of the standards of discrimination set out in regulations
implementing . . . the Rehabilitation Act [were] incorporated in the
38
ADA."
Not everyone in Congress agreed that the law was well formulated,
however. The dissenting view of Representative Charles Douglas of New
Hampshire argued that it would be impossible for employers to meet the
required standard of demonstrating a "business necessity" in order to justify
39
actions which negatively impacted individuals with a disability.
32. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 448-49. Although the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) House report specifically mentions the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), by way of analogizing

belated recognition of civil rights, it does not reference discrimination against women.
33. Nat'l Catholic P'ship on Disability, The Demographics of Disability (2003),

http://www.ncpd.org/demographics%20of/o20disability.htm.
The estimate is based on
figures from 2003.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) ("[S]ome 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities.").

35. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(111), at 23, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 446.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 449.
38. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Law and Explanation 9 (1990) [hereinafter
ADA Book].
39. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(111), at 93, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 510 (arguing
that the standard should mirror the "legitimate business purpose" standard applied in
discrimination cases against women and minorities). Douglas's reference to "business
necessity" refers to language throughout the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) ("[The term
'discriminate' includes.., using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of
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Douglas's remarks hinged on the importance of an individual not posing a
direct threat to those around him or her, and in his discussion Douglas also
directly addressed the issue of AIDS in the workplace. An AIDS-infected
food service worker, Douglas believed, might well succeed in putting the
worker's restaurant out of business because the mere mention of an infected
person in the workplace would cause panicky Americans to patronize the
restaurant down the street. 40 "[F]or the restaurant with an employee known
to have AIDS," wrote Douglas, "it will translate to no customers and no
business at all."'4 1 In his concluding remarks, Douglas argued that, though

one purpose of the legislation was to establish "reasonable expectation
between parties in conflict," here "Congress [had] abrogat[ed] its
constitutional duty by writing vague laws which must be clarified by the
Federal courts." 42 The notion that the law, or portions thereof, is vague has
3
also become the predominate view today.4
1.How Disability Is Classified
The general provision of the ADA mandates that "[n]o covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
'44
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Several definitions are key to understanding the statute. A covered entity is
an employer, 4 5 employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor
management committee. 46 Disability is defined as "[a] physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities" '4 7 of an individual, where an impairment is described as "[a]ny48
physiological disorder, or condition" which affects the body systems.
Where an individual cannot "perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform," or where that individual is
individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the
covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with

business necessity.").
40. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(111), at 93-94, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 511.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra Part I.A2.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Note that the ADA does not cover discrimination by the
federal government. Under "Exceptions" in section 12111 (5)(B)(i) of the ADA, the statute
indicates that the term "employer" does not include the United States. When individuals

bring an action for disability discrimination against the government, the alleged violation is
brought under the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
45. The statute contains a de minimis exception: "The term employer means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working
day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year .... 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(1) (2006).

46. Id. § 1630.2(b).
47. Id. § 1630.2(g)(1).
48. Id. § 1630.2(h)(1).
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"[s]ignificantly restricted" as to the way in which, and the amount of time
during which, he or she can perform that activity in comparison to the
general population, that individual is "substantially limited" in his or her
life activities. 4 9 Examples of major life activities included in the statute are
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.50
Finally, "[q]ualified
individual with a disability" means that the person "satisfies the requisite
skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the
employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
5
such position." '
Employers are permitted, under the ADA, to impose "[q]ualification
standards," which may include establishing specific requirements for a
position. 52 Those standards may be related to skill, experience, education,
or physical and medical requirements that serve as baseline criteria an
53
individual must satisfy in order to be considered eligible for the job.
According to the ADA, an employer may use concern for the health or
safety of workers as a reason for not hiring or retaining an individual with a
disability; this exception has been termed the direct threat defense. 54 This
provision of the statute reads,
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that
an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria
that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to
an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be
55
accomplished by reasonable accommodation ....
The statute further explains that it is permissible for those standards to
include a requirement that an individual "not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety" of others in the workplace. 56 The federal regulations
interpreting the ADA define direct threat as "a significant risk of substantial
harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation." 57 The regulation
further clarifies that the determination of whether an individual poses a
direct threat should be made on a case-by-case basis, established by that
58
individual's abilities and the requirements imposed by the job.

49. Id. § 1630.20)(1)-(2)

50. Id. § 1630.2(i).
51. Id. § 1630.2(m).
52. Id. § 1630.2(q).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000).
Id.
Id.§ 12113(b).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
Id.
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2. Ambiguity of the ADA: Contrasting Views

While there is generally no disagreement that the plaintiff bears the
59
burden of proving that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability,
courts and scholars strongly disagree over which party bears the burden of
proving or disproving that the employee poses a direct threat to him- or
herself or others. Some scholars argue that the structure and language of
the ADA are ambiguous, "plagued by vague terminology and inconsistent
cross-references" 60 when it comes to determining which party bears the
burden of proof. As one scholar explained,
[T]he statute includes the Direct Threat Defense under 'Defenses,' a
placement that suggests the employer has the burden of proof. But, the
statute also classifies the Direct Threat Defense as a 'qualification
standard,' language which suggests the employee has the burden of proof.
opinions have pointed out, the statute simply points in
As numerous court
61
two directions.
When the statute was first enacted, the effort to clarify the law's provisions
resulted in various published reports that sought to condense the law so as
to make it more readable. One such report, in clarifying the sections on
qualification standards and direct threat, explained,
Employers are not prohibited from setting qualification standards for their
employees ....A qualification standard may also include a requirement
that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of
other[s] . . . . It is not the responsibility of applicants or employees to
62
prove that they pose no risk.

This is one of the two accepted interpretations of the statute, the other being
that the employee does have an affirmative responsibility to prove that he or
she is not a direct threat. Because the language and structure of the ADA
"point in two different directions," both sides of the debate have been able
63
to justify their positions.
Various solutions to the ambiguity have been proposed. At least one
article has argued that Congress did not fully consider whether courts were
the proper branch of government to evaluate the substantive issues in
59. See, e.g., Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000);
EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997) (resolving the "qualified
individual" burden in the same way as the Hutton court but coming out differently on the
direct threat issue); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
("To sustain a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish. . . that he is qualified ...
(citing Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 1995)))).
60. Jon L. Gillum, Tort Law and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the
Need for a Realignment, 39 Idaho L. Rev. 531, 532 (2003). In his analysis, Gillum
concludes that efforts to find a "'hidden' answer" in the statute show "that the statute is
facially and totally ambiguous." Id. at 565. This assessment could be construed as being
particularly harsh, although undoubtedly the law could have been more effectively drafted.
61. Id. at 565-66.
62. ADA Book, supra note 38, at 37.
63. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
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analyzing whether an employee poses a direct threat in the workplace. 64
This argument insists that, because evaluating the direct threat standard
requires analyzing scientific data, the determination should be made by
65
medical and scientific experts qualified to render their opinion.
Supportive of this view is the fact that, in certain industries, a panel of
doctors is often used to determine if an employee is medically competent to
continue working at the job in question. 66 Scientific determination of the
issues is thus seen as a way to legitimize the legal process, with the
involvement of the courts limited to situations where the medical panel has
regulations or where members of the panel are
failed to comply with
67
implicated by fraud.
Another view suggests that because the employer is better situated to
offer evidence about the risks that would be created by a disabled
employee, the employer should bear the burden of proof.68 This view
argues against the employee bearing the burden of proof because it would
put "disabled persons in the same position they were prior to the passage of
the ADA-a position where they must single-handedly cure their secondclass status." 69 The contention is that placing the burden of proof on the
employee "gives employers a license to make preemptive and irrational risk
assessments," thus encumbering employees with a difficult standard while
giving employers a "windfall." 70 Employers are in the unique position of
having the best access to information about the job, so the argument goes,
and the requirement that employers bear the burden of proof 7best
conforms
1
to the antidiscrimination mandate the ADA sought to achieve.
a. Importance of Which Party Bears the Burden of Proof
Legal issues are nominally about facts, but in practice they are often
contests of persuasion concerning indeterminate matters.
Where
persuasion requires the jury to build complex 7inferences
...
the
risk
of
2
non-persuasion becomes a heavy burden indeed.
There have been several cases involving HIV-positive individuals,
decided in favor of the defendant employer, which have highlighted the
extreme significance that the threat to others plays in deciding the outcome

64. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, 'Typhoid Mary' Meets the ADA: A Case Study of the 'Direct
Threat' Standard Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
849, 936-37 (1999).
65. See id. at 938, 940. In the context of an employee claiming discrimination on the
basis of HIV infection, Van Detta's suggestion would pose difficulty. See supra text
accompanying notes 109-14.
66. Van Detta, supra note 64, at 945.
67. Id. at 948, 955.
68. Gillum, supra note 60, at 567-70.
69. Id. at 567.
70. Id. at 567-68.

71. Id. at 569-70.
72. Richard H. Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modem Discourse 26 (1992).
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of the case. 7 3 From a policy perspective, that result makes sense. However,
rather than focusing "on the fact that no transmission of HIV [had] ever
been medically documented . . . or on the fact that the risk of such

transmission [was] extremely difficult to quantify," the courts instead
concentrated their analysis on the possible
"catastrophic consequences" that
74
would ensue should transmission occur.
The Supreme Court has said that "[a] person who poses a significant risk
of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not
be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will
not eliminate that risk."'75 As a result, the determination of which party
bears the burden of proof becomes significant, as a multitude of academic
work indicates. An article published several years ago by Harvard Law
School Professor Bruce L. Hay explained,
[T]he plaintiff will file a claim if the defendant bears the burden of proof,
so long as the plaintiffs estimated chance of winning is greater than zero.
If, instead, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, then she will file a
claim if and only if the plaintiffs threshold for presenting evidence is
satisfied. For if that threshold is not satisfied,76the plaintiff knows she will
lose the case ... so there is no point in suing.

73. E.g., Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1291 n.15 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995); Estate of
Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998)). In both cases cited by the
Borgialli court, the plaintiff employees were HIV-positive and working in a surgical
capacity; both courts determined that the decision to terminate employment based on HIV
status was lawful. Compare Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Implementing the ADA's
Direct Threat Defense, 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1279, 1281 (2001) ("A surgical patient has more to
fear-including death-from a surgeon infected with hepatitis B than from one who has
HIV, yet hospitals will transfer or fire health care workers infected with the well-publicized
HIV even as they let the greater risks from the less-publicized hepatitis pass largely
unnoticed."), with Roni Caryn Rabin, When the Surgeon Is Infected, How Safe Is the
Surgery?, N.Y. Times, July 3, 2007, at F5 (discussing the danger surgeons infected with
contagious diseases, including HIV,pose to their patients).
74. Van Detta, supra note 64, at 933; see also Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d at
1263 n.5 ("[T]here is to date no documented case of an HIV-positive surgeon transmitting
the virus to a patient, even though there are a number of known cases of HIV-positive
surgeons operating on patients.").
75. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987) (explaining further that the ADA
"would not require a school board to place a teacher with active, contagious tuberculosis in a
classroom with elementary school children").
76. Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof,72 Ind. L.J. 651, 661 (1997). In his
article, Professor Hay develops a model with the objective of analyzing how to best
minimize the total costs of litigation. He uses the model to demonstrate that "the traditional
justification for giving the plaintiff the burden is incomplete," and to further argue that the
initial allocation must be examined to determine "how the burden of proof operates under
conditions where litigants are uncertain of a claim's merit and where out-of-court settlement
is possible." Id. at 651-53. This Note uses Professor Hay's work in order to articulate the
general principle that what transpires leading up to and during litigation correlates to which
party bears the burden of proof.
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This point of view argues that there is a stronger case for assigning the
burden of proof to the defendant as opposed to the plaintiff.77 The rationale
for the argument is that,
if the plaintiff expects her case to be heard in court, she has no incentive
to bring a claim she knows to be meritless [because it would be a waste of
time] ....

Accordingly

. .

. there is no point in forcing the plaintiff to

prove her case is78 meritorious, because she would not have brought it if it
were otherwise.
3. Disability and Contagious Disease
In 1987, the Supreme Court heard School Board v. Arline, 79 a case of
first impression. The issues were, first, whether an individual with a
contagious disease could be considered handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act and, second, if so, whether that individual was
"otherwise qualified" to teach at an elementary school. 80 Plaintiff Arline,
who had been diagnosed with tuberculosis in 1957 but who, for the next
twenty years, remained in remission, alleged employment discrimination
when she was suspended and then ultimately discharged from her teaching
position. 8 1 She was discharged only after her tuberculosis became active
again and after she had experienced several relapses. 82 In holding that a
contagious disease is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, 83 the
Supreme Court explained that "[a]llowing discrimination based on the
contagious effects of a physical impairment would be inconsistent with the
basic purpose of [the Act]," given the Act's goal of ensuring that the
disabled are not denied job opportunities because of assumptions about or
84
ignorance of their condition.
Post-Arline, courts use the four-factor inquiry developed by the Supreme
Court in that case as a first step in determining whether an individual with a
contagious disease is otherwise qualified or whether that individual poses a
direct threat to those around him.8 5 The four factors for consideration are
(1) the nature of the risk, (2) the duration of the risk, (3) the severity of the
risk, and (4) the probability that the disease will be transmitted and will
cause varying degrees of harm. 86 This four-factor test was codified in the
77. See id. at 657.
78. Id.
79. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).

80. Id. at 275 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 276.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 289. However, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justice Antonin
Scalia, dissented, arguing that contagiousness was not a handicap within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 289-93 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For further discussion,
see infra Part III (discussing contagiousness and comparing the behavior of tuberculosis visi-vis HIV).
84. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.

85. Id. at 288.
86. Id.
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federal regulations implementing the ADA, 87 and would also apply where
an HIV-infected individual brought suit under the statute. Although not
every individual infected with HIV or AIDS is considered disabled, because
the determination of whether a person is disabled is an inquiry particular to
the facts of each case, 88 individuals with overt manifestations of virus
symptoms would be considered disabled under the ADA. The statute's
protection of individuals with HIV and the limits on that protection are
further discussed in Part I.B. 1.
B. History of HIV/AIDS
Today, more than one million people in the United States are living with
HIV or AIDS, 89 but the virus has a much more pronounced history outside
this country. Forty-seven years after the first known case of AIDS appeared
in a human being, the disease still kills 8000 people per day and infects
14,000 more. 90 The largest number of these fatalities occurs in sub-Saharan
Africa, but AIDS mortality rates in India and China are quickly
approaching similarly dire levels. 9 1 According to the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), forty million people worldwide are
92
infected with the virus.
HIV is the virus that causes AIDS, and is transmitted from an infected
person to an uninfected person through blood, semen, or vaginal secretions
that come into contact with broken skin or mucous membranes. 93 Although
scientists have not determined how the first known person to test positive
for the virus became infected, there is data showing that the earliest case of
HIV-1 appeared in 1959, in a man's blood in Kinshasa, Democratic
Republic of Congo. 94 The virus has existed in the United States since at
least the 1970s, when a large number of homosexual men were diagnosed
with rare types of pneumonia (pneumocystis carinii), cancer (Kaposi's
sarcoma), and other illnesses, conditions not regularly found in individuals

87. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2006); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(111), at 34 (1990),
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 457.
88. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) ("The determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of
the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the
individual.") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)).
89. See
Centers
for
Disease
Control
and
Prevention,
CDC
Statistics,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/basic.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
90. Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., The Deep Roots of AIDS, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 2006,
at A25.
91. See Robert Steinbrook, The AIDS Epidemic in 2004, 351 New Eng. J. Med. 115-17
(2004).
92. Comprehensive International Program of Research on AIDS (CIPRA), Mar. 2006,
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/cipra.htm.
93. Centers
for
Disease
Control
and
Prevention,
What
is
HIV?,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/qa 1.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
94. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Where Did HIV Come From?,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/qa3.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
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with uncompromised immune systems. 95 As a result of a 1999 study by an
international team of researchers, it is now known that "[a] subspecies of
chimpanzees native to west equatorial Africa [was] the original source of
the human population
the virus... [and] that HIV-1 was introduced into
96
when hunters became exposed to infected blood."
For the purpose of discussing workplace discrimination, this Note uses
the terms HIV and AIDS interchangeably; clinically, they are not the same
thing. HIV is a virus that progresses by destroying blood cells, specifically,
CD4+ T cells, which protect the immune system. According to studies,
most people carry HIV for a long time before enough cells are destroyed to
effect the onset of AIDS. 9 7 The causal relationship between HIV and AIDS
has been long established by scientists and medical researchers. Twenty
person is infected with HIV,
years of research has confirmed that once a 98
that individual will most likely develop AIDS.
HIV infection is generally divided into five phases: the primary infection
phase (acute sero-conversion, meaning the change of an individual's status
from HIV-negative to HIV-positive); the asymptomatic latent phase; the
minor symptomatic phase; the major symptomatic phase marked by
opportunistic diseases; and the severe symptomatic phase characterized by
AIDS-defining conditions.9 9 Phase one usually begins between four and
eight weeks after someone has been infected, and between thirty and sixty
percent of those who are infected develop symptoms that include sore
throat, headache, fever, and muscle and joint pain, symptoms that generally
persist for seven to fourteen days.' 0 0 During the second, asymptomatic
phase, often referred to as the "silent" phase, an infected individual displays
no symptoms, but the virus nonetheless remains active, continuing to
is no less
weaken the individual's immune system.' 0 ' The disease
10 2
transmittable during this latent stage than during any other.
The third and fourth stages are marked by growing symptoms of
increasing severity, at which point opportunistic diseases-herpes,
tuberculosis, and others-appear because the CD4+ T cell count becomes

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Centers for Disease Prevention and Control, How Does HIV Cause AIDS?,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/hivaids.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
98. Centers for Disease Prevention and Control, Why Do Some People Make Statements
That HIV Does Not Cause AIDS?, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/qa38.htm (last
visited Aug. 21, 2007). But see Michael Specter, The Denialists,The New Yorker, Mar. 12,
2007, at 32 (discussing South African President Thabo Mbeki's refusal to acknowledge that
HIV causes AIDS and the resulting rise in clinics selling herbal remedies purporting to cure
AIDS).

&
Infection
of
HIV
Phases
and
99. Symptoms
http://www.health24.com/medical/Conditioncentres/777-792-814-1756,22216.asp
visited Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Symptoms and Phases].
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 121-23.

AIDS,
(last
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very low and the viral count is greatly elevated. 10 3 Finally, during phase
five, the onset of which normally occurs eighteen months after phase four,
the symptoms become more acute, marked by rare viruses that antibiotics
cannot treat. 104 People living with AIDS may have continuous diarrhea,
nausea, vomiting, respiratory infections, other sexually transmitted diseases,
cancer, warts, and infections of the central nervous system or brain. 105
Increasingly, however, a greater number of HIV-positive patients who
receive early antiretroviral drug therapy are living longer, healthier lives. 10 6
Before 1996, it was estimated that fifty percent of those with HIV would
develop AIDS within ten years. 107 Now, due to the availability of
antiretroviral drugs, HIV can be a manageable condition. In 2005, between
250,000 and 350,000 deaths were prevented through proper treatment. 108
Even after twenty-five years of studying the virus, however, there is still
much that scientists and doctors do not know about the disease. As one
doctor wrote in The New York Times in observance of the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the cluster of pneumonia cases among gay men that spawned
the discovery of AIDS,
Not everyone who is infected gets sick. Not everyone who is treated gets
well. Some people progress along the road from initial infection to
progressive immune deficiency to life-threatening illness at the expected
pace, then with treatment head right back again to health. Others stall
along the way, sick
or well, defying our dire predictions and happy
109
reassurances alike.
The article then provides examples of infected individuals who defy
medical logic in their recovery, including one of the author's biggest
success stories: a "skeletal fellow ... skin pulled taut over his skull, folds
of denim covering his wasted legs," who is actually "perfectly well.""10
Despite the fact that a decade ago he almost died of AIDS, this patient is
now "living with it-or, more accurately, living almost without it, his
103. Symptoms and Phases, supra note 99; see also supra text accompanying note 97.
104. Symptoms and Phases, supra note 99.
105. Id.
106. Antiretroviral drugs prevent the reproduction of retroviruses, of which HIV is a
specific type. These drugs help to minimize other illnesses caused by the virus, such as
opportunistic infections. See Nancy Ross-Flanigan, AntiretroviralDrugs, Gale Encyclopedia
of Med. (1999), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-g2601/is_0001/ai_2601000122.
However, antiretroviral drugs also have many negative side effects, and the infection can
become resistant to these drugs. For a more complete explanation, see U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Servs. et al., Guidance for Industry: Role of HIV Drug Resistance Testing in
Antiretroviral
Drug
Development
(2006),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/CDER/GUIDANCE/5879dft.pdf.
107. Centers for Disease Prevention and Control, How Long Does It Take for HIV to
Cause AIDS?, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/qa4.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
108. Global Health Council, http://www.globalhealth.org/view-top.php3?id=227 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2007). Created in 1972, the Global Health Council is a U.S.-based,
nonprofit organization whose purpose is to identify and report on world health problems.
109. Abigail Zuger, A Long Life? A Death Sentence? AIDS Still Offers No Easy Answers,
N.Y. Times, June 6, 2006, at FI.
110. Id.
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immune system normal, no trace of virus detectable in his blood. It is the
lifesaving drugs that have transformed his appearance . . . [yet] [h]is

appearance makes it hard for him to find work."'I
A number of health organizations that work with HIV patients also
support the notion that doctors should not make overarching conclusions
regarding the prospective health of an infected individual. The American
Association of HIV Medicine, in its amici curiae brief"12 in support of a
plaintiff who was refused a position as a foreign service officer at the State
Department because he was HIV-positive, 113 argued this very point. The
association reported that, after treating "tens of thousands of individuals
who [were] infected with HIV," it had found, "[b]ased on [their] experience
and knowledge about the course, effects and treatment of HIV disease...
that individuals with HIV experience a wide range of symptoms and
responses to treatment regimens, and that generalizations about the health
of any person with HIV are difficult to make with scientific accuracy."" 14
1. Limits on the Protections for HIV-Positive Individuals
In School Board v. Arline, the Supreme Court determined that individuals
with contagious diseases are disabled within the definition of the ADA and
are thus protected under the statute.1 15 Whether HIV or AIDS may always
be considered a disability, however, is a question that the highest court has
not answered definitively. Prior to 1998, the Court had not had the
opportunity to address the issue. In Arline, the Court explained, in dicta,
The United States argues that it is possible for a person to be simply a
carrier of a disease, that is, to be capable of spreading a disease without
having a "physical impairment" or suffering from any other symptoms
associated with the disease. The United States contends that this is true in
the case of some carriers of... [the AIDS] virus. From this premise the
United States concludes that discrimination solely on the basis of
contagiousness is never discrimination on the basis of a handicap. The
argument is misplaced in this case, because the handicap here,
tuberculosis, gave rise both to a physical impairment and to
contagiousness. This case does not present, and we therefore do not
reach, the questions [of] whether a carrier of a contagious disease such as
AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or whether such
a person could be considered, solely on the
basis of contagiousness, a
16
handicapped person as defined by the Act.'

111. Id.

112. Brief for American Association of HIV Medicine et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-5257), 2006 WL 558087
[hereinafter Taylor Amici Curiae Brief].
113. See Taylor, 451 F.3d 898.
114. Taylor Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 112, at 1-2.
115. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276-77, 279-86 (1987).
116. Id. at 282 n.7.
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The 1998 case of Bragdon v. Abbott 17 was the first time that the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to revisit, and also directly address, the issue of
whether HIV or AIDS infection constitutes a disability.
a. The U.S. Supreme Court'sDecision in Bragdon v. Abbott
In Bragdon, the Court held that HIV infection, even in an asymptomatic
individual, "is a physical impairment which substantially limits a major life
activity, as the [ADA] defines it."' 18 This decision was a huge step forward
in protecting individuals with HIV who might also be protected under the
ADA.
The asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff in Bragdon brought suit after a
dentist refused to treat her in his office but offered to do so instead at the
local hospital, where the plaintiff would have had to pay additional fees in
order to use the hospital's facilities."19 The issue was twofold: first,
whether HIV infection could be considered a disability under the ADA
when the individual was still in the asymptomatic stage of the disease, and
second, whether there was enough evidence on record to determine that the
plaintiff's infection did not pose a direct threat to the dentist treating her. 120
The asymptomatic or "silent" phase is described as the second stage, after
initial infection, where symptoms subside and the infected individual
returns to relative health. 12 1 Unlike tuberculosis, the infectious disease at
issue in Arline, which is not contagious when the disease is inactive, AIDS,
once thought to become inactive during the asymptomatic phase, is now
understood to remain active and infectious throughout all stages. 22 The
seemingly inactive phase occurs as the virus progresses from the circulatory
system to the lymph nodes, where it thrives.123 The Supreme Court found
that ADA section 12102(2)(A), which defines a disability as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [the] individual," 124 encompassed HIV infection, even during
the asymptomatic stage. 125 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stipulated
that the statute only applied where the condition implicated a major life
117. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
118. Id. at 641. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer joined.
However, Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined. Id. at
655. Justice Ginsburg also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 656. Chief Justice Rehnquist
concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas and
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in part II. Id. at 657. Justice O'Connor also filed an opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 664.
119. Id. at628-29.
120. Id. at 628.
121. See
Medical
Encyclopedia,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000682.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2007);
see also supra text accompanying note 101.
122. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635-36.
123. Id.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
125. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637-38.
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activity. For the Bragdon plaintiff, HIV infection limited her ability to
conceive children, and the majority had little trouble concluding that
126
reproduction was a major life activity.
The Court then proceeded to decide whether, in this individual's case, the
physical impairment was a substantial limit on the identified "major life
activity."' 12 7 Because of the high risk of virus transmission during gestation
and childbirth, as well as the possibility of transmission between adult
partners during sexual relations, the Court determined that infection did
substantially limit the plaintiffs ability to reproduce. 128 Significantly, the
Court concluded the discussion by declaring that "disability... does not
turn on personal choice."' 129 Subsequently, even though an HIV-infected
woman's actual ability to bear a child was not impossible, because
physiologically speaking she could still give birth, that fact did not
supersede the existence of a disability. 130 In conclusion, though the Court
maintained that, "[w]hen significant limitations result from the impairment,
the definition [of a disability] is met even if the difficulties are not
insurmountable," it nonetheless declined to decide whether HIV infection
was a "per se" disability under the ADA.131 In contrast to the Court's
refusal to decide whether HIV could be categorized as a "per se" disability,
at least one congressional committee during the 1990 ADA hearings found
13 2
that it could be so labeled.
133
Notably, the Court's decision in Bragdon was extremely contentious.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's dissent, in which Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas joined, and in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
joined in part, suggests the possibility of circumstances under which the
case might have been decided differently. 134 Key to the analysis, and,
wrote the dissent, a factor overlooked by the majority, was that there was no
evidence to indicate that, but for being infected with HIV, the plaintiff
would have otherwise had children. 135 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist
126. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that HIV infection implicates other major life
functions, as though to suggest that the plaintiff might have made her claim more broadly:
Given the pervasive, and invariably fatal, course of the disease, its effect on major
life activities of many sorts might have been relevant to our inquiry... it may
seem legalistic to circumscribe our discussion to the activity of reproduction. We
have little doubt that had different parties brought the suit they would have
maintained that an HIV infection imposes substantial limitations on other major
life activities.
Id. at 637.
127. Id. at 639.
128. Id. at 639-41 (citing several major studies on the percentage risk of transmission).
129. Id. at 641.
130. Id.

131. Id. at 641-42.
132. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(111), at n.18 (1990) ("Persons infected with [HIVI are
considered to have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and thus are
considered disabled under this first test of the definition.").
133. See supra note 118.
134. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 659.
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maintained that conceiving children might well not be categorized as a
major life activity. 136 The suggestion, ultimately, is that what constitutes a
life function should also be decided on an individualized basis, just as the
determination of whether a person is disabled is an individualized
inquiry. 137 In furtherance of this point, Justice Rehnquist cited the two
accepted meanings for defining "major": either "greater in dignity, rank,
importance, or interest," or, alternatively, "greater in quantity, number, or
extent." 138 The latter "greater in quantity" definition was the one Rehnquist
believed was most consistent with what the ADA legislators had
39
conceived. 1
The dissent's conclusions, should they become the majority opinion of
the new Supreme Court, could have serious repercussions in the field of
employment discrimination for an HIV-infected individual. For example,
suppose someone had never worked, either because of personal choice or
because of abundant family resources, then suddenly decided to apply for a
job and was rejected because he or she was infected. Prior to the point of
having applied for the position, the activity of working would never have
been "repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence"' 140
of that individual. Under Rehnquist's view, that would mean that the
discrimination was permissible because working was not a major life
activity in that person's life. Although working is listed in the regulations
applicable to the ADA as a life function,' 4 ' the Supreme Court could
nonetheless decide that the inquiry of what constitutes a major life activity
should also be individualized. The question would then become whether
that holding would preempt the objectives Congress set out to achieve.
2. AIDS in the Workplace: Stigma and Discrimination
Despite the fact that AIDS has existed in the United States for more than
thirty years, as with any disease transmitted primarily through sexual
intercourse, a considerable stigma still surrounds the virus. Although
public campaigns by celebrities-Magic Johnson, Greg Louganis, and
Arthur Ashe, to name a few142-have been hugely successful in educating
society about the virus, that work has not eradicated the negative
perceptions about those infected with HIV. Although some commentators
argue that AIDS is so mainstream-like cancer, also once a hugely
stigmatized disease-that the phobia once surrounding the disease is no
136. Id. at 658 n.2 ("Calling reproduction a major life activity is somewhat inartful.
Reproduction is not an activity at all, but a process. One could be described as breathing,
walking, or performing manual tasks, but a human being.., would never be described as
reproducing.").
137. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2006).
138. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 659-60 (citation omitted).

139. Id. at 660.
140. Id.
141. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3()(2)(ii) (1997).

142. For a more complete list, see

Wikipedia, List of HIV-Positive

People,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of HIV-positive-people (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
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longer a fear shared by the majority of the American public, that argument
overlooks the difficulty in dispelling myths ingrained in the national
psyche. In discussing the "irrational fear" of contagious diseases, the
Supreme Court noted in Arline that "[flew aspects of a handicap give rise to
' 143
the same level of public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness.'
The Court continued, "[T]he isolation of the chronically ill and of those
perceived to be ill or contagious appears across cultures and centuries, as
does the development of complex and often pernicious mythologies about
the nature, cause, and transmission of illness."' 144 A treatise on employment
law and discrimination on the basis of HIV status further discusses these
fears:
A compilation of surveys in 1988 reported that a minority of persons, but
a substantial number, viewed persons with AIDS as "offenders" who were
getting their rightful due and who should be isolated from the rest of
society; one in four persons indicated that they would refuse to work
alongside of a person with AIDS and that employers should have a right
to fire persons based on having AIDS. It is not unlikely that some of the
persons who hold these views are employers or judges who will be
deciding
claims of employment discrimination based on AIDS or HIV
status. 14.5
Although the data for this research was collected more than fifteen years
ago, the findings should not be overlooked. In addition, at least one more
recent study has demonstrated the great extent to which discrimination on
the basis of HIV infection or AIDS exists both in the American workplace
146
and in society generally.
Given evidence of the American public's negative perception of
individuals infected with AIDS, employer response might be the same.
Indeed, corporate response to the onslaught of HIV-positive employees has
often been hostile and discriminatory. 147 Under most circumstances, people
are generally not willing to disclose their medical information, or anything
about their personal lives, to those outside their immediate circle of friends
and family. A claim for HIV discrimination in employment exposes a
plaintiff to both of those painful realities. According to Dr. Cheryl GoreFelton, assistant professor of psychiatry at the Medical College of
Wisconsin, "The stigma around HIV, particularly because it can be
transmitted via sex and via injection drug use, makes it a particularly
volatile disease for people because they feel like they have to keep it secret.
That imposes a lot of stress on people about who they can disclose
to ....148 That stigma results in an agency problem inherent in the
143. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
144. Id. at 284 n.12 (citations omitted).
145. 2 L. Camille Hebert, Empl. Privacy Law § 11:6 (2007) (citation omitted).
146. See id.
147. Id.

148. Dan Ullrich, People with HIVIAIDS Now Considering Quality of Life, Healthlink,
Nov. 13, 2003, http://healthlink.mcw.edu/article/1031002311 .html.
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relationship between the employer and the employee: The employee wants
to keep his illness secret because he fears being fired, which results in a
lower probability that the employer will discover the employee's illness. If
the employee does justifiably pose a threat to the health of those around
him, the employer might have no way of knowing about the illness or any
means of creating a "reasonable accommodation"' 149 for that employee so as
to neutralize the threat.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

There is an almost even split among U.S. courts of appeals regarding
which party bears the burden of proof on whether an employee poses a
direct threat to his or her own safety or the safety of others in an
employment discrimination claim brought under the ADA. 150 While the
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that the defendant employer
bears the burden of proof, the First, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have said
that, generally, the burden lies with the plaintiff employee. 15 1 The Second
Circuit has said that the burden of proof lies with the defendant, but the
court only briefly touched on the issue in dicta.' 52 Other circuits have not
handled the issue: Both the Third 153 and D.C. Circuits 154 declined to decide
the issue. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit takes a middle ground, suggesting
that after certain components of the burden are satisfied, the obligation then
55
shifts to the opposing party.'
A 1. The Employer Bears the Burden of Proof
In three of the cases discussing the burden of proof on the direct threat
issue-EEOC v. Chrysler Corporation,156 Hutton v. Elf Atochem North
America, Inc., 157 and Branham v. Snow 15 8-the plaintiffs who brought suit
against their employers for discrimination in violation of the ADA were
diabetic. In all three circuits-the Sixth, Ninth, and Seventh-the courts
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
150. See Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the circuit
split on the burden of proof issue).
151. See id.
152. See, e.g., Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 35 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing Title II of
the ADA); Lovejoy-Wilson v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 2001)
("The legislative history of the ADA also supports the premise that '[t]he plaintiff is not
required to prove that he or she poses no risk."').
153. See Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining
that the plaintiff waived his right to dispute the burden of proof issue when he failed to raise

the argument with the district court).
154. See Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 905 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("In light of our
disposition, we need not decide who bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff poses a
direct threat to his health or safety. The parties did not argue the issue." (citation omitted)).
155. See Branham, 392 F.3d at 906 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Rizzo v. Children's
World Learning Ctrs., Inc. (Rizzo I),

173 F.3d 254, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1999).

156. 917 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
157. 273 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001).
158. 392 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2004).
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held that the employer bore the burden of proving that the former employee
had posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others. 159 In Chrysler
and Branham, the employee prevailed; in Hutton, the court held that the
defendant employer had lawfully discriminated because the employee was a
60
direct threat to those around him. 1
The courts' reasoning and decisions suggest that, where an employee
brings an HIV-related ADA discrimination claim, that employee would be
highly favored by a standard under which the employer bore the burden of
proof. Under the Sixth Circuit's approach, the inquiry regarding concerns
posed by a diabetic individual must be made on an individualized basis. 16
This requirement would similarly lead to a prohibition on blanket
inferences about an employee based on his HIV status. A court using the
standard adopted by these circuits would find unacceptable a company's
overly broad policies based on the alleged nature of a disease. In
responding to a suit by an HIV-positive plaintiff, an employer would be
required in these jurisdictions to make his case under more exacting criteria
and would have to defend the company's actions in a manner similar to how
those actions would be defended where an employee was diabetic.
In spite of the heavy burden imposed on a defendant employer, that party
would nonetheless be protected from the potential danger an HIV-positive
worker might pose. For example, where the risk was comparable to the one
presented by the plaintiff in Hutton, a court would find judgment in favor of
the defendant, just as the Ninth Circuit found in Hutton, despite having
allocated the burden of proof to of the defendant employer. 162 The holding
in these circuits might also result in a lower barrier to initiating an ADA
claim for an HIV-positive employee who would not have otherwise pursued
such an action if the reverse standard applied.
1. The Sixth Circuit
In EEOC v. Chrysler Corporation,the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan held that it is the defendant employer's burden to
prove that the plaintiff employee suing for discrimination under the ADA
does not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others.163 Ultimately,
the plaintiff prevailed.
The case involved charges brought by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of David Darling, an applicant
for a heavy industrial electrician position at Chrysler, a job that he had
performed at other companies for the preceding twenty-five years. 164
Darling was offered the job at Chrysler contingent upon his submission to
159. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
161. See infra Part I.AI.1.
162. See infra Part II.A1.2.
163. See 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1171 (E.D. Mich. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 172 F.3d
48 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished disposition).
164. Chrysler, 917 F. Supp. at 1165.
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drug and medical tests as required by company policy. The test results
revealed that he had elevated blood sugar levels, and he was diagnosed with
Type II diabetes mellitus. 165 At that time, Darling was not prescribed
medication even after he had appointments with a private physician and his
blood sugar levels continued to be elevated. 166 Over the next several
weeks, Darling's blood sugar levels remained normal, but he was
nonetheless prescribed medication. 167 Thereafter, the plant employment
supervisor informed him that the employment offer was being withdrawn
because of his elevated blood69sugar levels. 16 8 Subsequently, the EEOC
filed suit on Darling's behalf. 1
Although the first point of disagreement was whether Darling could even
be classified as an individual with a disability, the court held that Darling
had a definite impairment, which restricted his ability to perform a variety
ofjobs. 170 However, the court also found that Darling was qualified for the
job, was in control of his diabetes, and was receiving the proper care and
appropriate treatment. 17 1 Furthermore, the court concluded that, letters
from Darling's physician clearly stated that the patient did not manifest any
and that he was "able to work without
"diabetic complications"
172
restrictions."
The district court's final analysis centered on Chrysler's claim that
Darling would be a direct threat to his colleagues at the plant because of his
elevated blood sugar level. 173 In specific terms, the court explained that the
determination of whether an employee is a direct threat is similar to the
analysis of whether a person is a qualified individual, with the critical
difference being that in the instance of demonstrating a direct threat, the
defendant has the burden of proof. 174 Finding that the defendant Chrysler
had no solid evidence to support "ominous predictions" of what might
happen to Darling during the course of his employment as a result of his
diabetes,1 75 the court issued an injunction against the company, prohibiting
the "blanket exclusionary" policy of denying employment to anyone with a
blood sugar level greater than a specific, arbitrary number. 176 Of particular
concern to the court was the fact that the company doctor never examined
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1165-66.
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id.
Id. For a discussion on diabetes and the ADA, see Margaret C. McGrath, Insulin-

Dependent Diabetes and Access to Treatment in the Workplace: The Failure of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct to Provide Protection, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 957 (2004).

170. See Chrysler, 917 F. Supp. at 1167-69.
171. Id. at 1169-70.

172. Id. at 1170 (quoting Letter from Bradley C. Berger, Private Physician to Chrysler
(Oct. 13, 1993); Letter from Bradley C. Berger, Private Physician to Chrysler (Oct. 4,
1993)).
173. Id.

174. Id. at 1171.
175. Id.

176. See id. at 1173.
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Darling, but rather "that she determined Darling posed a threat based on the
experiences related to her by other employees about their diabetic
conditions, not on an individual assessment of Darling."' 177
This
conclusion, said the court, was manifestly contrary to the policy required by
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). 178 The speculative risk that Darling posed a direct
threat to those around him, which Chrysler attempted to use in order to
effectively withdraw the employment offer without subjecting the company
to liability for an ADA violation, failed both by the court's reasoning and
17 9
by a detailed reading of the evidence on record in relation to the statute.
2. The Ninth Circuit
The defendant employer in Hutton v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc.
operated a twenty-four-hour chlorine and chemical product manufacturing
plant, where the plaintiff Hutton was employed as a chlorine finishing
80
operator for nine years. 1
Unlike the Chrysler plaintiff, Hutton was a Type
I diabetic, and the company was aware of his diagnosis at the time of hiring
him.181 Hutton was not in control of his diabetes, however, and had
experienced a number of diabetic episodes, including insulin shock,
seizures, and loss of consciousness, while at work.182 Particularly troubling
about Hutton's incidents, the court found, was the fact that his position
entailed operating equipment that produced, stored, and transferred liquid
chlorine. 183 Hutton's employer notified him on several occasions of the
position's requirements, including that he remain under the company
doctor's care, submit evidence of medical examinations, and maintain a
daily log chronicling his diet and insulin intake. 184 After a period of
inconsistency in complying with those requirements, in addition to another
diabetic incident while on the job, Hutton was suspended and then
ultimately terminated when the company could not find another position at
the plant where Hutton's condition could be accommodated.1 85

177. Id. at 1171-72 (relying on the company doctor's deposition).
178. Id. at 1172. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2006) provides in part that "[t]he determination

that an individual poses a 'direct threat' shall be based on an individualized assessment...
based on reasonable medical judgment."
179. See Chrysler, 917 F. Supp at 1172.
180. Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2001).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 886-87, 889; see also id. at 892 n.3 (explaining that the district court had
misread the record and that "Hutton experienced a 'blackout' on only one occasion, when he
lost consciousness .... The other instances [were] 'diabetic episodes' in which Hutton
experienced difficulty communicating and muddled thoughts, but did not black out").
183. Id. at 886. Although liquid chlorine is not explosive independently, it can become so
upon contact with other compounds. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Facts
About

Chlorine,

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/chlorine/basics/pdf/chlorine-facts.pdf

(last

visited Sept. 20, 2007).
184. See Hutton, 273 F.3d at 887.
185. Id. at 887-88, 891 (citing Letter from Larry Hellie, Reg'l Human Res. Manager, Elf
Atochem N. Am., Inc., to Norman Hutton (Mar. 22, 1999)).
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In evaluating Hutton's claim that the district court had erroneously ruled
186
that he was a direct threat to the health and safety of those around him,
the Ninth Circuit recited the four-factor test from Arline, ultimately
concluding that, "[b]ecause it is an affirmative defense, the employer bears
187
the burden of proving that an employee constitutes a direct threat."'
Similar to analysis by other courts, 188 the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in a
footnote the discrepancy among U.S. Courts of Appeals' holdings on this
issue but, unlike the other circuits, did not suggest a rationale for the
difference. 189 Despite the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the defendant
employer carried the burden of proof, the court nonetheless held that the
potential for harm, should Hutton continue in the position of chlorine
90
finishing operator, posed a grave risk under the direct threat analysis.'
Subsequently, the court found Elf s decision to terminate Hutton
warranted. 19 1
3. The Seventh Circuit
The plaintiff in Branham v. Snow was also a Type I insulin-dependent
diabetic but, in contrast to Hutton, was in control of his disease by way of
diet, exercise, medication, and a physician's care. 192 By all accounts,
Branham exercised excellent management of his diabetes.1 93 Employed by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as a revenue agent for twelve years,
Branham sought and applied for a position as a criminal investigator within
the same organization. 194 In addition to the educational and physical
requirements of the investigator position, which included carrying a weapon
and working under inclement weather conditions, the qualification
standards specified that "'[a]ny condition that would hinder full, efficient
performance of the duties . . . or that would cause the individual to be a
hazard to himself/herself or to others is disqualifying."" 19 5 The additional
restrictions stipulated that those applicants with a chronic disease or
condition would be ineligible if the condition rendered full performance of

186. See id. at 886, 891-92.
187. Id. at 893.
188. See Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004).
189. See Hutton, 273 F.3d at 893 n.5 (explaining that "[n]ot all other circuits share our
view that the defendant-employer should bear the burden of proof on the direct threat
issue"). The court further explained that the burden lies with the plaintiff in the First and
Eleventh Circuits, but that the Seventh, Tenth, Third, and Fifth Circuits have not provided a
clear answer. Id. Note that Hutton was decided before the definitive case law on this issue
occurred in either the Seventh or Tenth Circuits. See Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906
n.5 (7th Cir. 2004); McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1353-55 (10th Cir. 2004).
190. See Hutton, 273 F.3d at 894 (citing Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226,
231 (3d Cir. 2000)).
191. Id. at 895.
192. Branham, 392 F.3d at 899.
193. See id. at 901.
194. Id. at 899-900.
195. Id. at 900.
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their duties impossible. 196 Several month- after applying for the position,
and after examination by a doctor working for the IRS, Branham was
deemed unable to perform the essential functions of the job, either with or
without reasonable accommodation. 197 Branham then brought suit against
198
the IRS under the Rehabilitation Act.
The parties in Branham agreed that diabetes was a physical impairment
that could potentially limit an individual's major life activities. The
Seventh Circuit then sought to address whether in the plainiff's case his
diabetes so limited him. 199 Citing Bragdon v. Abbott2 °° and Sutton v.
United Air Lines20 1 as precedent, the court concluded that Branham's
diabetes did in fact limit his major life activity of eating.2 0 2 The court then
turned to the overriding issue of whether the plaintiff posed a direct threat
to the health or safety of others, 203 and subsequently found that he did
2
not. 04

In reaching the central holding in Branham, the Seventh Circuit
explained that while generally it is the plaintiffs burden to prove that he is
qualified to perform the essential functions of a job (for a claim brought
under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA), "it is the employer's
burden to show that an employee posed a direct threat to workplace safety
that could not be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation. '20 5 In a
lengthy footnote, the court went on to explain the disagreement among the
circuit courts over the burden of proof issue, ultimately concluding,
We see no reason to revisit the established law of this circuit in this case.
Our earlier decision [in Dadian v. Village of Wilmette] finds support in the
plain wording of the statute and in common sense. The [IRS] is certainly
in the best position to furnish the court with a complete factual assessment
of both the physical
qualifications of the candidate and of the demands of
20 6
the position.

196. Id.at 900.
197. Id.
198. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006). Dubbed "the Rehabilitation
Act," this legislation prohibits discrimination in a government agency against an otherwise
qualified individual because of that individual's disability. See supra Part I.
199. Branham, 392 F.3d at 902.
200. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
201. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
202. See Branham, 392 F.3d at 902 ("An impairment need not cause an 'utter inabilit[y]'
to perform the major life activity in order to constitute a substantial limitation on that
activity." Id. at 902 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998))); see also id. at
903 ("[T]he Supreme Court has noted that it would be contrary to the language of the ADA
to find 'all diabetics to be disabled,' regardless of whether an individual diabetic's condition
actually impaired his daily activities." (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,
483 (1999))).
203. Branham, 392 F.3d at 904.
204. Id. at 908.
205. Id. at 905-06 (quoting the court's prior decision in Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269
F.3d 831, 841 (7th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

206. Branham, 392 F.3d at 906 n.5 (referring to Dadian,269 F.3d 831).
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However, the court acknowledged the understandable struggle by other
circuits in deciphering which party is legally required to bear the burden of
proof:
Commentators have suggested that the confusion stems from the language
of the ADA itself, since the statute includes the direct threat language in a
section entitled 'Defenses,' which suggests it is an affirmative defense on
which the defendant bears the burden of proof, but also classifies the
direct threat analysis as a 'qualification standard,' which suggests that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he or she does not constitute
a
20 7
direct threat, as part of the burden to prove he or she is qualified.
Nonetheless, the court relied on prior Seventh Circuit case law, the statute
itself, and "common sense" to establish the unambiguous legal principle at
20 8
play.
In arguing that no evidence existed to prove that he posed an imminent
threat to those around him, Branham used the court's findings in Hutton as
support. 20 9 Branham highlighted the fact that frequent occurrences of an
on-the-job medical incident often served as a precursor to a court's
conclusion that the plaintiff was a direct threat. Thus, Branham himself
was not a threat because he had never suffered a serious hypoglycemic
incident while at work. 2 10 The Seventh Circuit ultimately declined to
answer whether an at-work episode was a prerequisite for concluding that
an employee poses a direct threat to those around him.2 11 The case was
eventually remanded after the court's finding that Branham did not pose an
imminent risk of harm
and that he was qualified for the criminal
21 2
investigator position.
A2. The Effect of the Employer Burden of ProofStandardin the Context of
HIV-Related Discrimination
The courts in pro-employee circuits make clear that it is not permissible
to discriminate against a disabled employee under the pretext of a direct
threat defense based on the remote possibility that a downturn in that
2 13
individual's condition might occur, thus threatening those around him.
This standard would result in a huge advantage for HIV-infected
employees: An employee's susceptibility to contagions brought on by a
compromised immune system would make it more difficult for an employer
to determine when that individual was a threat. Because this standard
207. Id. at 907 n.5.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 908; see also Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884 (9th Cir.
2001). In Hutton, the court found that the defendant employer bore the burden of proof but
nonetheless held for the defendant. See infra Part II.A2.
210. Branham, 392 F.3d at 908 (citing Hutton, 273 F.3d at 884).
211. See id. at 908. For a discussion on proof rules in general, see Ronald J. Allen, The
Nature of JuridicalProof,13 Cardozo L. Rev. 373, 383-84 (1991).
212. See Branham, 392 F.3d at 908-09.
213. See supra Part II.A1.1; see, e.g., text accompanying notes 173-79.
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requires that an employer bear the burden of proof following an adverse
employment decision based on a worker's disability, a plaintiff employee
would be able to spend less time refuting the defendant's affirmative
defense and more time proving the other elements of an ADA claim, which
in the context of HIV is an inordinately difficult task. The legal system
might benefit from this approach as well: Higher scrutiny of the medical
evidence presented by the plaintiff as part of his prima facie case might
either point to weak elements of his argument or underscore holes in the
employer's affirmative defense.
Conversely, this standard could also produce negative implications for an
employer that could not be cured absent judicial manipulation of the
standard's rigidity. Given that an HIV-positive plaintiff will have difficulty
proving the medically related components of his claim, an employer would
be at an even greater disadvantage not only because he would bear the
burden of proof on the direct threat issue, but also because of the near
impossibility of proving that the employee poses a direct threat. Where an
employee's health regressed to the point at which he did pose a direct
threat, but where he later regained health and was no longer a threat, an
employer would be hard pressed to prove that somewhere in that narrow
window the employee was fired under circumstances which constituted
lawful discrimination. This standard might also substantially obstruct a
jury's ability to scrutinize the issues by redirecting the burden of proof to
the defendant when the direct threat might be perceived as part of the
plaintiff's threshold case. A remedial measure, such as a jury instruction,
could compensate for this problem; however, studies have proven that,
statistically speaking, jurors do not
accord jury instructions as much weight
2 14
as the legal system might believe.
B 1. The Employee Bears the Burden of Proof
The three cases holding that the employee bears the burden of proving
that he or she is not a direct threat to the health or safety of others were
decided by the First, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 21 5 In the first case, the
1996 decision of Moses v. American Nonwovens, 216 the plaintiff was an
epileptic working at a heavy machinery plant. The second and third cases,
EEOC v. Amego, Inc.2 17 and McKenzie v. Benton, 2 18 decided in 1997 and
2004 respectively, both involved plaintiffs who were suffering from
psychological disorders and were directly responsible for the care or safety
of others. In all three cases, the defendant employer prevailed on appeal.
214. This might be because jury instructions are often long and difficult for jurors to
remember. To further complicate the issue, some jurisdictions do not even permit the
instructions to be given in writing to a jury. See generally Ronald J. Allen et al., Evidence:
Text, Problems, and Cases 85-86 (4th ed. 2006).
215. See infra notes 216-18.
216. 97 F.3d 446 (1lth Cir. 1996).
217. 110F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997).
218. 388 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Just as an HIV-positive employee benefits under a standard where the
employer bears the burden of proof,2 19 an employer benefits equally or to
an even greater degree under a standard where the employee bears the
burden of proof. A court following pro-employer reasoning would adhere
to the alleged unequivocal language of the statute that each of these circuits
embraces. For an HIV-positive plaintiff litigating in the Eleventh Circuit,
the result would be that he or she would always bear the burden of proof,
regardless of extenuating circumstances. 220 Although the First and Tenth
Circuits both purported to reject the strong language asserted by the
Eleventh Circuit, the resulting burden on an HIV plaintiff would
nonetheless be the same.
Assigning the burden of proof to the employee would uniquely affect an
HIV-positive plaintiff because the nature of the AIDS virus creates
difficulty in establishing nearly any element of a prima facie case, let alone
disproving the direct threat element. 22' This standard would render it that
much more difficult for an infected employee to sustain the foundational
components of his or her case, and the inability to disprove the employer's
direct threat defense could offset the otherwise sound elements of the
claim. 222

1. The Eleventh Circuit
The strongest language insisting that the burden of proof lies with the
plaintiff was articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Moses v. American
Nonwovens, Inc.22 3 The Moses court explained that "[t]he employee retains
at all times the burden of persuading the jury ...

that he was not a direct

threat. '2 24 The court came to that conclusion upon finding that Moses, the
epileptic plaintiff who worked as, among other things, a product inspector
and who supervised fast-moving press rollers from an elevated platform,
had not produced sufficient evidence to prove that he did not pose a direct
threat. 225 Indeed, Moses did not dispute the possibility that had he not been
terminated by American, he might have had seizures while at work. 226 The
district court, according to the Eleventh Circuit, had not erred by granting
summary judgment for the defendant employer because the plaintiff had not
sustained his 7burden of disproving that he was a direct threat to those
22
around him.

219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra Part ILAI.
See supra Part II.A2. 1.
See generally supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.A.2.a.

223. 97 F.3d 446 (lth Cir. 1996).
224. Id. at 447.
225. Id. Moses also worked in several other capacities, including those which required
him to sit underneath a conveyer belt and next to machinery with temperatures as high as

350 degrees Fahrenheit. See id. at 447-48.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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2. The First Circuit
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Moses, in Amego, the First
Circuit agreed that the burden of proof was with the plaintiff, but specified
that such a standard was implicated where an essential function of the job
involved securing the health or safety of others. 228 Unlike the Moses
court's insistence that the plaintiff bore the burden of proof "at all
times," 229 the Amego court undertook a more detailed analysis of the direct
threat issue, which included scrutiny of the statutory language and
legislative intent. 230 Ultimately, however, the court reached a conclusion
2 31
similar to the Eleventh Circuit, and the Amego plaintiff lost on appeal.
Amego, the defendant employer, was a nonprofit organization providing
232
care for individuals with autism and other severe behavioral problems.
The patients in residence at Amego were considered "legally incompetent"
and most had such severe disabilities, including aggression and a tendency
to engage in self-injuring behavior, that they came to Amego only after
having been discharged or rejected by other facilities. 233 Employed as a
"Team Leader," plaintiff Anne Marie Guglielmi's responsibilities entailed
caring for severely disabled patients; she was also charged with
administering their medications. 234 In 1991, Guglielmi began to have acute
mental and emotional problems and thereafter sought therapy for drug
abuse, bulimia, and depression. 235 After her suspected involvement in a
series of problems at various Amego facilities, including patients'
overdoses and the disappearance of large amounts of medication, she
revealed to Amego that she had attempted to commit suicide by overdosing
on drugs twice within the previous six weeks. 236 The company's safety
committee subsequently concluded that she could not safely perform the
essential functions of her job, and more specifically the task of
2 37
administering medication to patients, and Guglielmi was later fired.
The First Circuit's discussion of the contested issues in Amego centered
on the wording of the ADA statute and the confusion, or disagreement,
engendered by the statute's language regarding the burden of proof for the
direct threat issue.
In discussing the direct threat and qualification
standards components of the ADA, the court said, "The rub is that the
language about 'qualification standards' under Title I appears in a section of

228. 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997).
229. Moses, 97 F.3d at 447.

230. Amego, 110 F.3d at 142-44.
231. Id. at 144.
232. EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (D. Mass. 1996). Some facts of the
case are more thoroughly described in the district court opinion. This part uses both cases to
describe the factual background.
233. See id. at 1040; see also Amego, 110 F.3d at 135, 138.
234. Amego, ll0F.3dat 137.
235. Id. at 138-40.
236. Id. at 138-41.
237. Id. at 141.
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the statute entitled 'Defenses."' 238 After introducing the EEOC's argument
that the direct threat provision should be read as the employer's burden to
prove because it falls under the "Defenses" section, the court explained in a
footnote,
The confusion on this point is reflected in the legislative history. During
congressional hearings, Representative Dannemeyer asked a witness, who
had contributed to the drafting of the ADA, who had the burden of proof
on the direct threat issue in the communicable disease context. The
witness replied that the plaintiff, as part of his prima facie case, would
have to put on evidence
that his communicable disease would not pose a
direct threat to others. 239
The court then went on to cite the unequivocal language from Moses that
the "'employee retains at all times the burden of persuading the jury ...that
he was not a direct threat."' 240 Although the First Circuit's holding does
not appear until two pages after this discussion, the court essentially
implied that the statutory scheme, supplemented by established case law,
could nonetheless independently render the burden of proof issue
24 1
dispositive, despite the statute's confusing structure.
In deciding that the statutory language was ambiguous, the court returned
to legislative history to resolve the matter. 242 The court found that there
was "no congressional intent to preclude the consideration of essential job
functions that implicate the safety of others as part of the 'qualifications'
analysis, particularly where the essential functions of a job involve the care
of others unable to care for themselves." 243 The court then discussed
Congress's objective in codifying the direct threat standard (articulated by
the Supreme Court in School Board v. Arline244), which the court
interpreted as suggesting that, based on legislative objective, "the burden is
on [the] plaintiff to show that he or she is qualified in the sense of not
posing a direct threat. '24 5 Thus, the court reasoned, the direct threat issue
should be analyzed under the qualification section, where the burden of
proof would rest with the plaintiff employee. 246

238. Id. at 142.
239. Id. at 142 n.4 (citing Staff of H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 101st Cong., The
Americans with Disabilities Act 1896 (Comm. Print 1990)).
240. Id. at 142 n.4 (citing Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (1 1th Cir.
1996)).
241. See id. at 142-44.
242. Id. at 143.
243. Id.
244. 480 U.S. 273, 284-86 (1987).
245. Amego, 110 F.3d at 143. In furtherance of its point, the court also cited the 1990

House report: "' [I]f the applicant is otherwise qualified for the job, he or she cannot be
disqualified on the basis of a physical or mental condition unless the employer can
demonstrate that the applicant's disability poses a direct threat to others in the
workplace.. . . The plaintiff is not required to prove that he or she poses no risk."' Id.
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 46 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 469).
246. Id. at 143.
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Using the Rehabilitation Act 247 and the Supreme Court's discussion in
Arline,248 the court explained that whether the plaintiff is otherwise
qualified and whether that individual poses a direct threat to others were
questions that should be considered together. 24 9 Unlike the questions under
consideration in Arline, which necessitated that the otherwise qualified
question and the direct threat matter be analyzed separately, the issues in
Amego could not be resolved separately because "the issue of risk posed to
others [arose] in the context of a core function of the job. '2 50 In dismissing
the EEOC's claim that the ADA defines "qualified individual" differently
than the Rehabilitation Act (because the issue of potential danger to others
is not mentioned in that section of the ADA), the court explained that, in
spite of the ADA's language, Congress intended for the statute to be
2 51
analyzed in light of the definition embodied by the Rehabilitation Act.
Under the Rehabilitation Act, qualification does include the risks posed to
others and consequently, the court argued, that definition should be read
252
into the ADA.

Additionally, the court found that in Guglielmi's position the inability to
perform the essential job function of supplying patients with medication
would create a danger to others. 253 In further discussion of this point, the
court stated "[t]hat a failure to perform a job function correctly creates a
risk to others does not preclude the ability to perform that function from
being a job qualification." 254 If that were not the case, the court explained,
then the result would be a "lesser burden" on the plaintiff in a position
where she was caring for others than where she was not. 25 5 Finally, in
reaching the central holding of the case, the court highlighted that in other
jurisdictions courts had considered the "risk" issue and the qualification
2 56
issue together where the plaintiffs position involved the care of others.
In conclusion, the court held,
[I1t is the plaintiffs burden to show that he or she can perform the
essential functions of the job, and is therefore "qualified." Where those
essential job functions necessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff

247. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000).

248. 480 U.S. at 287-89.
249. Amego, 110 F.3d at 143.
250. Id. at 143-44.
251. Id. at 144.
252. Id.
253. Id. Disclosure of psychological problems to an employer can often be risky, despite
protections afforded by the ADA. See generally Susan G. Goldberg et al., The Disclosure
Conundrum: How People with PsychiatricDisabilitiesNavigate Employment, 11 Psychol.
Pub. Pol'y & L. 463 (2005).
254. Amego, 110 F.3d at 144.

255. Id.
256. Id.
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must demonstrate that
she can perform those functions in a way that does
2 57
not endanger others.
The court upheld the district court's ruling of summary judgment for
258
defendant Amego.
3. The Tenth Circuit
When the Tenth Circuit decided McKenzie v. Benton, the court
specifically referred to the factual circumstances and holding in Amego as
authority for concluding that the plaintiff Lorraine McKenzie bore the
burden of proving that she was not a direct threat. 259 McKenzie served as a
deputy sheriff in Wyoming for ten years until she voluntarily resigned in
1996 in order to seek psychological treatment. 260
Earlier that year,
McKenzie had been diagnosed with various psychological problems,
including post-traumatic stress disorder, which was the result of being
sexually abused by her father when she was a child. 26 1 Absenteeism from
262
her job became more frequent as McKenzie's condition deteriorated.
2 63
Following an incident in which she fired shots at her father's grave,
McKenzie was placed on leave; thereafter, several more episodes occurred
264
during which she imposed self-inflicted wounds and overdosed on drugs.
Although a letter from her psychiatrist was sent to the sheriffs office
warning that McKenzie might pose a danger both to other officers and to
26 5
the public, she was never fired but rather resigned on her own accord.
After several weeks of treatment, McKenzie reapplied for a job with the
state after her physician wrote a letter clearing her to resume work. The
letter, however, did not mention McKenzie's disability or the possibility of
further psychological breakdowns. 2 66
Thereafter, a series of events
occurred whereby McKenzie was passed over for several different jobs
within the sheriffs office because of her past psychological episodes. 267 At
trial, "the jury found that McKenzie was 'disabled' under the law, that she
was 'otherwise qualified,' and that the defendants had 'discriminated'
against her because of [her] disability, [but] they also found that McKenzie
257. Id. Following this holding, the court said that "[t]here may be other cases.., where
the issue of direct threat is not tied to the issue of essential job functions but is purely a
matter of defense, on which the defendant would bear the burden." Id.
258. Id.
259. McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Amego, 110
F.3d at 144).
260. McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1345-47.
261. Id. at 1345.
262. Id.
263. Id. It should be noted that McKenzie's actions were not as such illegal, a fact that
was acknowledged by the defendants on the first appeal. See McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d
967, 974 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001). The defendant's name changed in the 2004 appeal because
Benton replaced Dovala as sheriff following this suit. See id. at 969 n.2.
264. McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1345-46.
265. Id. at 1346.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1346-47.
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posed a 'direct threat' to herself or other officers." 268 Thus, though there
had been discrimination, the actions taken by the sheriff's office were
nonetheless not in violation of the ADA because McKenzie was a direct
threat and therefore could be legally subject to discrimination by an adverse
employment decision. 269 The Tenth Circuit noted in the 2001 appeal,
[S]ubject to narrow exceptions such as those for employees who pose a
"direct threat" to the health or safety of others, the ADA's antidiscrimination provision . . . protects McKenzie from adverse
employment action based on conduct related to her illness so long as she
'270
does not pose a "direct threat."
On the second appeal, one of the issues the plaintiff contested was that
the trial court had incorrectly instructed the jury that she, as the employee,
bore the burden of proof.2 7 1 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the
trial court had correctly found that the burden should lie with the plaintiff,
not with the defendant employer. 272 In so holding, the McKenzie court
offered a comprehensive analysis of the ADA and relevant case law,
including Moses, Rizzo II, Amego, and Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal
Co. 2 73 After a discussion of those cases, the Tenth Circuit explained, "We
are . . . persuaded that it is proper for the defendant-employer here to
consider the direct threat factor in connection with possible re-employment
of McKenzie [and] that McKenzie bore the burden of proof on not being a
direct threat."' 274 The court's reasoning was based on the language of the
ADA, which, although it lists direct threat under an employer's defenses,
explains that "'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace. ' 27 5 The Tenth Circuit did not further
elaborate on the statute's meaning, but focused instead on evidence
presented at trial that McKenzie had engaged in repeated acts of violence,
including self-inflicted wounding, the grave-shooting incident, and
generally "reckless and dangerous conduct." 276 These factors, in light of
the wording of the statute, served as the basis for concluding that McKenzie
2 77
bore the burden of proving that she did not pose a direct threat to others.

268. Id. at 1347.
269. Id.
270. McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
271. McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1348.
272. See id. at 1353-56.
273. See id. at 1354 (citing Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir.
2000); Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc. (Rizzo II), 173 F.3d 254 (5th Cir.
1999); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997); Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc.,
97 F.3d 446 (11 th Cir. 1996)); see also infra Part II.C.
274. McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1354-55.
275. Id. at 1355 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1990)).
276. McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1355-56.
277. Id.
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269

B2. The Effect of the Employee Burden of ProofStandardin the Context of
HIV-Related Discrimination
The pro-employer standard effectively allows a defendant employer the
security of asserting an affirmative defense in response to a charge of HIVrelated discrimination which will not be subject to question unless the
plaintiff is able to sustain the burden of disproving that defense. 2 78 For an
employer who acted lawfully in terminating an employee, where the AIDSinduced illness did make the employee a direct threat but where it would be
impractical for the employer to so prove, the employer is protected from
expending additional time and money. 2 79 Furthermore, in the event that the
HIV-induced illness was a highly complicated ailment, 2 80 an employer
could avoid the onerous task of pinpointing why that disease would render
the infected employee a threat to those around him.
Under the standard espoused by the Eleventh, First, and Tenth Circuits,
an employer would have an indisputable advantage, and the employee
would be at an equivalent disadvantage. Under circumstances where the
adverse actions taken against the employee were discriminatory, an HIVpositive plaintiff might be unable to prove the employer's underlying
wrongful intent, especially if there is insufficient medical documentation to
corroborate the employee's health. 2 81 The employee's case becomes more
complicated under this standard because of the difficulty of proving
sequentially that the action was not taken at a time when the employee was
ill and posed a threat. In assigning the employee the burden of proof, the
presumption of innocence swings in favor of the employer.
Aside from the problems posed for a plaintiff employee, there are other
considerations that might reflect negatively on this standard. One such
concern is the potential for diminishing the plaintiff's credibility as a
witness, a problem that is significantly exacerbated in a jury trial. If voir
dire does not screen out jurors with an obvious bigotry towards HIVinfected individuals, and if jurors do not generally comprise a standard
distribution of biases that are reflective of those held by the American
public, then the stigma against HIV-positive individuals could be
perpetuated in the courtroom. 282 Under the pro-employer burden of proof
standard, the plaintiff might already have two strikes against him or her:
one, because of HIV or AIDS status, and two, because of the burden of
proving why, in spite of that illness, he or she did pose a direct threat to
others at the time of the firing.

278. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
279. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
280. See generally supra Part I.B. (discussing the rare types of diseases that AIDS can
produce).
281. See generally infra Part l.B.
282. There is, however, a valid argument "that a diverse jury will express a range of
views during deliberation and will correct for... stereotypes." Allen, supra note 214, at 123.
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C 1. Middle of the Road Approach
The Fifth Circuit's 1999 decision effectively split the difference between
which party bears the burden of proof on the direct threat analysis. In
reaching the central holding in Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers,
Inc. (Rizzo II), the court explained that while the burden initially lies with
the plaintiff to prove that as a qualified individual she is not a direct threat,
insofar as a court determines that safety constraints routinely screen out
those who are disabled, then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
employer. 283 The court's analysis flatly rejected the contention in Moses
that the burden of proof always lies with the plaintiff.284 On the contrary,
the Fifth Circuit's middle of the road approach suggests that the employer
should bear the burden of proof when it is not apparent that the job function
at issue poses a threat to others. 285 Ultimately, affirming the district court
286
decision, the Fifth Circuit held in favor of the plaintiff.
The middle of the road approach endorsed by the Fifth Circuit would
result in an uncertain and highly variable outcome for an HIV-positive
employee who claimed discrimination. It is unlikely that an employer
would have already instituted a policy that screened out that class of
individuals because the nature of the disease would make it difficult to do
so. Under such circumstances, the HIV-positive plaintiff would have a
heavy burden indeed. Alternatively, where an employer had previously
screened out individuals with contagious diseases, and where the employee
was sick with such an infection at the time he or she was terminated, then
the employer would bear the burden of proof. The behavior of the AIDS
virus would greatly frustrate the ability to prove the existence of elements
that would shift the burden of proof to the defendant employer. That
difficulty could easily result in the HIV-positive plaintiff generally bearing
the burden of proof.
1. The Fifth Circuit
Plaintiff Victoria Rizzo was a hearing-impaired employee of an
educational and day care facility, Children's World Learning Center

283. Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs, Inc. (Rizzo I),

173 F.3d 254, 259-60 (5th

Cir. 1999).
284. Id. at 259 (explaining that "[w]e disagree with the Moses opinion only insofar as that
opinion allows for no exceptions to [the] rule"). The court also cited the Moses language
that the employee "'at all times' retains the burden of proof. Id. (quoting Moses v. Am.
Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
285. See, e.g., Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1293-94 (10th Cir.
2000) (discussing Rizzo II, 173 F.3d 254).

286. Rizzo II, 173 F.3d at 258, 263.

But see id. at 263-74 (Wiener, J., dissenting)

("[W]hen an employee plaintiff is responsible for ensuring the safety of others entrusted to

her care as part of her essential job duties, she bears the initial burden of proving that she can
perform those duties in a way that does not endanger others. If she cannot sustain this
burden, she cannot show that she is an 'otherwise qualified individual with a disability,' an
indispensable element of her prima facie case." (citation omitted)).
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(CWLC), who claimed that she was demoted because of her disability. 287
The district court determined that CWLC had discriminated against Rizzo
because of her hearing impairment, a decision from which the employer
appealed. 288 The facts in Rizzo H were disputed, 289 and thus bear repeating.
Rizzo suffered from what the court found to be a "substantial" hearing
impairment, which was implicated primarily in her duty of driving students
to and from school in the CWLC van. 290 After complaints from a parent
that Rizzo had been unable to hear the request of a child riding in the van,
in addition to that parent's concern that Rizzo's hearing impairment might
prevent her from hearing an emergency (such as a child choking), which
could occur while Rizzo was driving, CWLC relieved Rizzo of her duty to
transport children. 29 1 Thereafter, her other duties were impacted as well,
such that she worked two different shifts, one in the morning and one in the
afternoon in order to compensate for the lost hours.2 92 By the time Rizzo
was
quit her job and filed suit for discrimination under the ADA, she
293
working fewer hours than were required to retain her health benefits.
In addressing CWLC's claims that the lower court erred in reaching its
decision, the Fifth Circuit reframed the two issues central to the conflict:
whether Rizzo posed a direct threat to the children under her direction and
whether CWLC or Rizzo bore the burden of proving or disproving that she
was a direct threat. 294 In rephrasing these questions, the court underscored
the controversy over the burden of proof issue. 295 CWLC's defense, which
utilized the Eleventh Circuit's language from Moses, was that the plaintiff,
as one element of proving that she was a qualified individual with296a
disability, bore the burden of proving that she was not a direct threat.
The Rizzo II court explained the Eleventh Circuit's rationale, reiterated by
CWLC, that "'the employee retains at all times the burden of persuading the
jury... that he was not a direct threat"' 2 97 by pointing to the Eleventh
Circuit's reliance on the official interpretation for the correct reading of the
ADA. The interpretation, the court explained, provided by a provision of
the interpretive guidance to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) reads, "An employer may
require, as a qualification standard, that an individual not pose a direct

287. See id. at 257.
288. See id.

289. Id.
290. Id. at 258.
291. Id.
292. Id. Rizzo claimed that in changing her duties, CWLC effectively demoted her. One
of Rizzo's new tasks was to cook meals in the CWLC kitchen. Id.
293. Id. However, as the court pointed out, CWLC never in fact rescinded Rizzo's
benefits. See id.
294. Id.
295. Id. The court explained, "At first glance both the caselaw from the different federal
circuits and the federal regulations themselves appear to be in conflict." Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 258-59 (quoting Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11 th Cir.
1996)).
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threat to the health or safety of himself/herself or others." 298 Because this
guideline discusses whether the plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a
disability," the Fifth Circuit clarified, "the burden of proof would
apparently fall on the plaintiff.

'29 9

The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation, however, was not the only way in
which the interpretive guidance could be construed, according to the
plaintiff.30 0 In support of her position, Rizzo used the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers., Inc. (Rizzo 1) to
bolster the contention that, "'as with all affirmative defenses, the employer
' 30 1
bears the burden of proving that the employee is a direct threat. "'
Furthermore, Rizzo contended, the interpretive guidance states that "'with
regard to safety requirements that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability... an employer must demonstrate that the
requirement, as applied to the individual, satisfies the direct threat
standard."' 30 2 Finding in favor of Rizzo on this issue, the court insisted
that, despite disagreement by other courts, a correct reading of the case law
and regulations indicated that no conflict actually existed.30 3 There was no
discrepancy, the court reasoned, because the burden only lies with the
defendant when requirements have already screened out those with a
disability.30 4 The court proceeded to further elucidate the point in a
footnote, stating,
For example, had CWLC instituted a "safety requirement" that any
teacher whose responsibilities included van driving also be a statecertified teacher with a minimum of a bachelor's degree in education, the
burden in such a case would remain on the plaintiff to prove that she is
not a direct threat. It is the nature of the safety requirement itself, and
whether it tends to screen out the disabled,
that determines if the burden
30 5
of proof should shift to the defendant.
In other words, if a class of disabled individuals had previously been
eliminated from the pool of employees, then subsequent termination of an
employee because of the threat he or she poses would likely be held
discriminatory. In the instant case, the court found that CWLC had
established a policy whereby any employee who transported children in the

298. Rizzo II, 173 F.3d at 259 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) interpretive guidance

(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).
299. Id.
300. See id.
301. Id. (citing Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc. (Rizzo 1), 84 F.3d 758, 764
(5th Cir. 1996)). In Rizzo I,the district court granted summary judgment in favor of CWLC.
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that there were issues of material fact as to
whether Rizzo posed a direct threat to the safety of the children in her care, and whether
CWLC's actions in changing her employment duties were in violation of the ADA. See
Rizzo I, 84 F.3d at 765.
302. Rizzo II, 173 F.3d at 259 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)-(c)) (citations omitted).
303. See Rizzo II, 173 F.3d at 259.
304. See id.
305. Id. at 259 n.6.
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van had to be able to distinguish among spoken words. 306 This policy
constituted a safety requirement to screen out persons with hearing
disabilities, and for that reason the defendant would bear the burden of
307
proving that Rizzo was a direct threat.
The Rizzo II court concluded by summarizing its findings with reference
to the Moses holding. The Fifth Circuit explained that, although it
generally agreed that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to
demonstrate that she is not a direct threat, it nonetheless objected to the
Moses court's refusal to permit any exceptions to the rule. 308 Finally, the
court reiterated its central holding that where the employer's safety
requirements screen out a certain class of individuals with a disability,
when a lawsuit is brought, the employer bears the burden of proving that
the employee is a direct threat. 309 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit flatly
rejected CWLC's argument that the court should use a "balancing test" as a
means of weighing the importance of protecting the children in an
employer's care against the necessity of preserving a plaintiffs
employment interest. 3 10
Under the court's scrutiny of the ADA,
congressional intent was quite clear: Had Congress intended the balancing
test that CWLC proposed, it would have done so unambiguously. 3 1'
Notwithstanding this rebuke, however, the court declined to find that
CWLC's appeal was "frivolous" and deserving of sanctions, as requested
by Rizzo. 3 12 The court found that CWLC had acted in "good faith" given
the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Moses and the generally conflicting case
law. 313
The dissent's approach in Rizzo II, written by Judge Jacques Wiener and
premised on the plaintiffs failure to produce a report by her audiologist
establishing that she could safely operate a van with children on board,
seriously questioned the majority's reconciliation of the direct threat
issue. 3 14 In Judge Wiener's view, previous Fifth Circuit decisions 3 15 and
306. See id. at 259.
307. See id.
308. See id. (citing Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the employee "at all times" retains the burden of proof')).
309. Rizzo II, 173 F.3d at 259-60.
310. Id. at 261. CWLC suggested that the court should "determine whether CWLC
'properly balanced the need to protect the children in its care and Rizzo's interest in
continued employment at the Learning Center."' Id. (citation omitted).
311. See id.

312. Id. at 263.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 263 (Wiener, J., dissenting). Judge Jacques Wiener's reference to the
audiologist's report is discussed in Rizzo L After a parent expressed concern and a director
from CWLC questioned whether Rizzo could hear a child choking in the back of the van,
CWLC removed her from driving duties until she brought a report from her audiologist
confirming that she was capable of driving the van. See Rizzo 1, 84 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir.
1996). Rizzo did submit a report stating that she could hear emergency vehicles, but it
contained no mention of whether she would be able to hear a child choking. As a result,
CWLC maintained that Rizzo would not be permitted to resume her driving responsibilities
until it had received that report. See id. at 760-61. Rizzo explained that the audiologist
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the holding in EEOC v. Amego, Inc. 31 6 made clear that "when an employee
plaintiff is responsible for ensuring the safety of others entrusted to her care
as part of her essential job duties, she bears the initial burden of proving
that she can perform those duties in a way that does not endanger
others." 3 17 However, Judge Wiener admitted that the statutory language
was vague, in part because the qualification standards, including that an
employee not pose a direct threat to those around him, which the ADA
permits, appear in the "Defenses" section of the statute. 3 18 The burden is
on the employee to prove that he or she is a qualified individual, but the
qualification standards appear under "Defenses"; therefore the statute is
potentially ambiguous as to which party bears the burden of proving or
3 19
refuting the direct threat claim.

In contrast to what he characterized as the majority's "burden-shifting
formula," 320 which sought to "harmonize the ADA's apparently conflicting
requirements that both the employer and the employee prove their direct
threat contentions," 32 1 Judge Wiener felt that by reconciling the statute to
shift the burden of proof based on the presence of certain facts, the majority
incorrectly read the law. 322 Judge Wiener believed that by assigning the
plaintiff the burden of proof on the direct threat issue for essential duties,
while still retaining for the employer the direct threat claim as an
affirmative defense for nonessential tasks, the inherent tension in the
323
ADA's statutory language would resolve itself.

The dissenting opinion pointed to three critical factors as to why the
majority's analysis was faulty. First, in practice the defendant always bears
the burden of proof because whenever the direct threat issue arises, it
necessarily suggests that the employer has imposed safety standards, thus
requiring an inquiry into those standards. Second, the majority's analysis
produces the paradoxical result of imposing a lesser burden on the plaintiff
where the job involved risk to others and a greater burden where it did not.
Finally, the majority's "burden-shifting formula" conflicted with other Fifth
Circuit decisions prior to Rizzo L 324 In conclusion, Judge Wiener explained
would have to accompany her to work so as to make that determination, an arrangement to
which CWLC agreed. See id. at 761. However, no report was ever issued. See id. In Rizzo
II,the majority observed that "there is no evidence that a choking child even makes a
sound." 173 F.3d at 259. This finding was a continuation of the discussion in Rizzo I, where
the court said "there is no evidence that a choking child makes any noise, let alone exactly
what sound the child would make. It is possible that even a driver with perfect hearing could
not hear a child choking in the back of the van." 84 F.3d at 763 n.3.
315. In support of his point, Judge Wiener cited to Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d
1385 (5th Cir. 1993) and Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
316. 110F.3d 135 (lstCir. 1997).
317. Rizzo II, 173 F.3d at 263 (Wiener, J.,dissenting).
318. Id. at 271 (emphasis omitted).
319. Id. (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
320. Id. at 272.
321. Id. at271.
322. See id. at 272.
323. See id. at 273.
324. Id. at 272-73. For the other cases that Judge Wiener cited see supra note 315.
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that, at least initially, the burden of refuting the contention that the
325
employee is a direct threat must lie with the plaintiff.

C2. The Effect of the Fifth CircuitApproach
in the Context of HIV-Related Discrimination
The Fifth Circuit's approach in many ways reconciles the objectionable
aspects of the other two standards as applied to an HIV-related ADA case,
namely that both the pro-employer and pro-employee standards always
favor one litigant over another. 326 In contrast, the Rizzo II court's approach
provides no clear-cut favoritism for either the employer or the employee, a
327
fact suggesting that it is a more equitable standard.
The middle of the road approach introduces an additional problem: the
risk that neither party will be adequately protected. Arguably a standard
that favors one party over another is no better than a standard that equally
disfavors both; however, the latter creates a circumstance where there is no
clear expectation of the rights between the parties, thus leaving too much
uncertainty. The danger is that, because proving or disproving the direct
threat in the context of HIV is so difficult, the plaintiff might never bring a
claim at all or the defendant might settle too early, both in spite of the
3 28
relative strengths of their cases.
Another problematic component of the burden-shifting standard is that,
while the Rizzo I majority provides a brief example of what would
constitute a qualification standard that had already screened out a certain
class of individuals, that example and accompanying explanation do not
definitively resolve the issue. 329 The court overlooks the possibility of a
less obvious qualification standard that might effectively screen out a class
of disabled individuals but where that restriction would not be readily
apparent.
Lastly, Judge Wiener's dissenting view points out that the Fifth Circuit's
standard makes it possible for a plaintiff to maintain a lower burden of
proof where the employment position involves risk to others than where it
does not. 3 30 This prospect raises the concern that an employer might not be
able to sufficiently protect individuals in circumstances where an HIVpositive employee deals with sharp objects or other dangerous instruments
that could injure him or her and expose others to infected blood. The public
health implications under such circumstances could potentially be severe.

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See id. at 274.
See supra Parts II.A2, II.B2.
See supra Part ILCI.1.
See supra Part I.A.2.a.
See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 314-25.
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III. DETERMINING WHICH PARTY BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF:
THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER'S ROLE

The determination of whether an employee is a direct threat is made on
an individualized basis. 33 1 Although there is a sound argument that a
similar standard should be used in determining which party bears the
burden of proving that an employee is a direct threat, equitable
considerations counsel against such reasoning. The burden of proof
assignment is often outcome determinative in litigation, a truism that
requires a more careful legal standard when an employer claims that an
employee poses a direct threat to those around him. 332 Where an employer
creates a specific set of requirements for a position, which an employee
must meet in order to be qualified for the job, an employer is better situated
to demonstrate why an individual cannot perform those requirements safely
and without being a threat to others. For those jobs where the requirements
are less well defined, an employer is the only one who could know why an
employee is a threat. This argument is even more compelling in the context
of alleged AIDS-related employment discrimination because the nature of
the disease presents uncertainty about how the virus will affect an
individual 333 and is a key reason why the employer should bear the burden
of proof for a direct threat defense.
Contagious-disease-related discrimination claims also merit a more
demanding burden on the defendant employer because of the tremendous
and continued stigma borne by those who are infected. Recall that in
School Board v. Arline, the issue was whether the school district had
lawfully discriminated against a teacher who was infected with a contagious
disease, tuberculosis. 334 In order to answer this question, the Supreme
Court had to decide, first, whether a contagious disease could be considered
a handicap, and, second, if so, whether a person with a contagious disease
would be "otherwise qualified" to teach schoolchildren. 3 35 The behavior of
Arline's tuberculosis is quite similar to how HIV might behave; Arline was
336
in remission for years before her tuberculosis became active again.
Individuals who are HIV-positive might progress to full-blown AIDS, only
to revert back to HIV status. 3 37 Unlike tuberculosis, however, which is
principally an airborne disease, spread through saliva droplets that are
emitted into the air when a person coughs, sneezes, or speaks, 338 there are
no studies demonstrating that either HIV or AIDS can be transmitted via
331. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2006).
332. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
333. See supra Part I.B.
334. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 275 (1987). For further discussion of Arline,
the history of the ADA with respect to contagious disease, and the direct threat standard, see
Van Detta, supra note 64, at 849.
335. Arline, 480 U.S. at 275.
336. See supra text accompanying note 81.
337. See supra Part I.B.
338. National Institute of Allergy & Infectious Disease, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/
healthscience/healthtopics/tuberculosis/basics/transmission.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
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saliva. 339 Since there are essentially two ways in which AIDS can be
transmitted-through blood or sexual intercourse-and because it cannot be
transmitted through casual contact, the argument that an employer's
discrimination against an infected individual would ever constitute a
legitimate direct threat defense is weak. If that contention is true, then it
necessarily follows that the law should impose a more exacting burden on a
defendant employer.
Arguably the ADA was never intended to apply to temporary
conditions.3 40 Although AIDS is a terminal illness for which there is no
cure and it would be incorrect to label it a "temporary" affliction, the
characteristics of the disease often render opportunistic infections transitory
34 1
because infected individuals may recover from those illnesses.
Furthermore, unlike a situation where an employee has a psychiatric
disorder, 342 or is prone to sudden seizures, as in the case of an epileptic or
diabetic individual, the side effects of HIV and AIDS generally do not
appear without warning. 34 3 An individual living with the virus may
function in relative health for years, perhaps without ever even knowing
that he or she is infected. 344 With 40,000 new cases of AIDS in the United
States each year, and with estimates that perhaps as many as 250,000
members of the total AIDS population in the United States are living
unaware of the fact that they are positive, 34 5 the possibility of
discrimination is quite high.
In spite of the circuit split, one might reasonably argue that courts were
generally able to reach the appropriate result in each of the seven cases
discussed above. 346 Should someone with uncontrolled, post-traumatic
stress syndrome who had previously demonstrated dangerous behavior be
armed with a gun and working in law enforcement? 347 Should a highly
339. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV and Its Transmission 1 (1999)

http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets/PDF/transmission.pdf (explaining that "no
scientific evidence to support [the fears that HIV might be transmitted in other ways] has
been found. If HIV were being transmitted through other routes.., the pattern of reported
AIDS cases would be much different from what has been observed"); see also id. at 3
("Contact with saliva, tears, or sweat has never been shown to result in transmission of
HIV.").
340. Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing
Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1994)). In Borgialli, the plaintiff
suffered from psychiatric problems, including severe depression and personality disorders.
Id. at 1287. The Tenth Circuit upheld the verdict in favor of the defendant, who had
employed the plaintiff as a blaster in a mine, upon finding that the plaintiff was not a
"qualified person" for the position. Id. at 1295.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
342. See Borgialli,235 F.3d at 1287.
343. See generally supra Part I.B.
344. See id. For more on the topic of individuals living with the virus undetected, see
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Urges H. V. Testsfor Adults and Teenagers, N.Y. Times, Sept.
22, 2006, at Al (discussing the federal government's recommendation that all teenagers and
many adults be subject to HIV tests as part of their annual checkup).
345. See McNeil, supra note 344.
346. See supra Part II.
347. See generally McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342 (1 0th Cir. 2004).
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qualified individual be prevented from becoming a criminal investigator
simply because he has diabetes, a condition that he has nonetheless
controlled with diet and medication? 34 8 Undoubtedly, the answer to both
questions is no. If courts generally reach the right decision, all the while
using conflicting standards in assigning the burden of proof to the parties,
then why does it matter that there is disharmony among the courts? It
matters because of the potentially disastrous deterrent effect of not having a
clear, equitable standard.
The possibility that an individual who has legitimately experienced
discrimination on the basis of his disability might not bring suit because of
the difficulty of proving that he is not a direct threat to those around him is
unacceptable under any standard. This is further compounded when the
individual has been the subject of discrimination because he or she has
AIDS. Under those circumstances, discrimination could be shrouded by an
employer's direct threat defense where an individual had an illness as a
result of the underlying infection, but where the real concern was AIDS
itself; then, the discrimination would have less legitimacy than if it were
based on the actual illness.
A. Impact of Continued Workplace Discrimination
With no cohesive guidance from the federal courts on the way in which
the direct threat issue should be resolved, HIV-infected employees who feel
that they have been the subject of wrongful discrimination will be more
hesitant to bring claims against their employers. The result will be a
negative impact not only on the lives of those employees, but also on the
companies who may have violated the ADA. Even without a cure for
AIDS, people who receive proper medical care will continue to live
productive, successful, generally healthy lives. 349 To further ostracize those
individuals by saddling them with the burden of proof under all
circumstances sends the message that society does not care about their
active contributions to the workforce and reinforces the potency of already
existing stereotypes. If the purpose of protecting people with disabilities
stems from the fact that "society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities," and that "such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem, ' 350 then the effective result of the circuit split thwarts the goal of a
progressive, inclusive American society.
B. The Approach in Rizzo II
35 1
The Fifth Circuit, along with the Seventh Circuit in Branham v. Snow,
thoroughly addressed the circuit split on the direct threat burden of proof
348.
349.
350.
351.

See generally Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2004).
See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(2) (2000); see also Parts LA -A3.
392 F.3d 896.
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issue. 3 52 The Rizzo H court, however, used a more careful analysis to
reconcile the ambiguous statutory language and conflicting case law with
3 53
the court's holding.
While the Branham court touched on the problem but ultimately
concluded that existing case law in that jurisdiction prevailed and that no
further discussion was warranted, the Fifth Circuit identified the nuances
raised by the issue, recognizing that the unbending Eleventh Circuit
standard, whereby a plaintiff would always have the burden of proof, was
both unrealistic and undesirable. 3 54 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
sensitive nature of the burden of proof issue and the importance of
offsetting concerns, and upheld a standard which the court thought would
serve the interests of both parties while respecting the legal constraints
imposed by Congress. 355 Although the court purported to reject the
"balancing test" proposed by defendant CWLC, 356 the eventual standard
recognized by the Fifth Circuit did balance competing interests in the form
of a shifting burden: Where qualifications standards previously screened
out individuals with disabilities, the defendant would have to bear the
burden of proof.3 57 This standard permits a balance between allowing an
employer to create qualification standards and protecting an employee from
standards that, as applied, potentially violate the ADA.
While the court's comprehensive discussion bears recognition in light of
358
the cursory way in which several other courts handled the controversy,
the Rizzo JI holding nonetheless did not go far enough in protecting
individuals from the effects of an employer's discriminatory behavior. In
discussing the Fifth Circuit's legal standard, the Rizzo II court offered an
example where the burden of proof on the direct threat issue would remain
with the plaintiff in spite of a safety requirement instituted by an
employer. 359 Although the court's hypothetical-requiring all teachers to
have a bachelor's degree in education-is a straightforward example of a
requirement that could not be construed as screening out the disabled, it
ignores the possibility of a less obvious requirement that could be
interpreted in two different ways, either as a prescreen for the disabled or
not. For a very technical position, where a court would not have the
expertise necessary to evaluate whether a requirement was arbitrarily
screening out the disabled, there is a risk that a court might misinterpret the
requirement's purpose and, under the Rizzo II court's standard, erroneously
keep the burden of proof with the plaintiff. This possibility renders the
Rizzo H holding unsatisfactory.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 205-08 for a discussion of Branham and 287313 for a discussion of Rizzo IL
353. See supra Part II.C1.1.
354. See supra Part II.B1.1.
355. See supra Part II.CI.1.

356. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Part II.CI.1.

359. See supra text accompanying note 305.
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Resolution of the burden of proof issue requires that a court undertake a
thoughtful analysis, as did the Rizzo II court, but necessitates that the
ensuing standard be straightforward and easily applied. Had the Seventh
Circuit in Branham gone further in explaining its findings by elucidating
the considerations at play and explaining the reasons for the perceived
ambiguity in the ADA, that court's holding would have stood as a fine
example for other courts to follow. Because the Seventh Circuit did not do
so, the ambiguity persists, and what Judge Wiener termed the Fifth Circuit's
"burden-shifting formula" 360 is insufficient to rectify that ambiguity.
1. The Employer and the Burden of Proof
Apart from the argument that the language of the ADA and legislative
history support assigning the burden of proof to the employer,3 61 there are
other compelling reasons for doing so. Scholars have underscored the
notion that the employer is often in the best position to demonstrate why an
employee would be a threat to those around him.362 Consider that an
employer creates a job, is familiar with the intricacies required by that
position, and knows how and in what capacity the person who performs that
job will interact with others in the organization. It would be unreasonable
to expect employers to know the specifics of a complaining employee's
illness or disability, but it is not unreasonable to expect an employer to
respond to a claim of discrimination with proof of why someone would
need to be able to meet certain physical requirements in order to perform
the job. Furthermore, an employer would also be aware of the ways in
which that employee could be isolated from others so as to nullify the threat
he would have otherwise posed. By requiring that the employer bear the
burden of proof, courts will further ensure that defendant employers are not
engaging in unlawful discrimination because the legal standard will impose
on them a more onerous obligation, that of proving the legitimacy of the
direct threat defense. 363 This standard forces the employer to act when
the employer to
faced with a charge of discrimination, rather than allowing
364
simply assert a direct threat defense and do little else.
2. Public Policy Concerns
This country was founded on principles of equity. That those principles
have subsisted over time is a credit to their underlying spirit and purpose.
There were, unquestionably, many practices that were acceptable and legal
360. See supra text accompanying notes 320-25.
361. See supra Part I.A.2.
362. See id.; see also Gillum, supra note 60, at 569. Gillum argues that this approach

"limit[s] the potential for employers to revert to discriminatory practices based on subjective
or insincere determinations of risk." Gillum, supra note 60, at 569.
363. See Gillum, supra note 60, at 569.
364. See id. (explaining that assigning the burden of proof to the employer "still gives
employers a powerful defense to charges of discrimination, but the interpretation also makes
employers 'work' for that concession").

2007]

AIDS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

at the time the U.S. Constitution was written that today's society no longer
finds compatible with the basic guarantees of freedom espoused by that
very document. The Constitution's guiding principles serve as a framework
for this country's legal system and are the reason today that there are laws
in place protecting those whom the law has long failed to protect. The core
of that basic principle-that the law seeks to correct wrongs against those
who cannot protect themselves-serves as a fundamental reason for which
an employer should bear the burden of proof. This approach also supports
the goal of balancing considerations between discouraging frivolous
litigation and ensuring a just legal system that enables wronged individuals
to bring meritorious claims.
Because AIDS has proven to be a disease that tends to ostracize
individuals from society, it is especially important in AIDS-related
employment discrimination cases that courts be cognizant of equitable
issues. The sensitive nature of an infection-related discrimination claim
requires that employees be given ample opportunity to demonstrate how
and why they were wronged. This should be done without assigning to
them the additional burden of proving why they are not a direct threat,
particularly in light of the other elements of an ADA claim that a plaintiff is
365
required to prove.
CONCLUSION

Without legislative action to clarify the burden of proof issue, this
controversy will only be resolved when decided by the Supreme Court. The
recent change in leadership on the Court, however, raises concern regarding
the relevance of the direct threat defense in employment discrimination
cases. During Justice Samuel Alito's confirmation hearings, liberal groups
expressed concern over his support, during his tenure in the Reagan
administration, of what he believed was an employer's prerogative to fire an
employee with AIDS. 366 Explaining his reasons for supporting that right,
Justice Alito "told The Washington Post, 'We certainly did not want to
encourage irrational discrimination, but we had to interpret the law as it
stands.' 367 This comment demonstrates the importance of an unambiguous
standard because "the law as it stands" on this issue is not at all clear. 368
Indeed, Justice Alito's colleague, Justice Scalia, who joined Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Arline, might similarly interpret the law
as it currently exists. One basis for the dissenting opinion in that case was
365. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note 5.
For a discussion of the elements of an ADA claim that a plaintiff is required to prove, see
Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 905-08 (7th Cir. 2004). See also McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (discussing the Title VII burden shifting
paradigm, which also applies in ADA cases).
366. David D. Kirkpatrick, Liberal Coalition Is Making Plans to Take Fight Beyond
Abortion, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2005, at Al.

367. Id.
368. See id.
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that the school district had dismissed Arline because she was contagious,
not because of any diminished physical capabilities. 369 The dissent found
that the Rehabilitation Act did not cover contagiousness as a handicap, a
rule that could also screen out a healthy AIDS patient from legal protection
3
under the ADA.

70

Despite how far the United States has come since the first known cases of
AIDS, both with regards to understanding the virus and in terms of success
in treating it, evidence suggests that "employers still continue to take
actions that appear to be based simply on their negative reactions to
employing individuals who are HIV-positive rather than on any valid
concerns about the ability of those persons to perform the jobs in
question." 37 1 Standing alone, this finding supports an argument for greater
protections for individuals who are disabled because of an infectious
disease. A law protecting infected individuals only has credibility if it is
successful in the pursuit of that protection. As the direct threat issue now
stands, blighted by ambiguous statutory language and conflicting legal
standards among the circuits, it fails to adequately protect the individuals
that it was designed to defend.

369. See supra note 83.
370. See supra note 83.
371. See Hebert, supra note 145, § 11:6 (June 2007).

